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ventromedial prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and temporal pole, was negatively associated with delay
discounting. Furthermore, this brain data predicted differences beyond those typically accounted for by other
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ABSTRACT 
 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN VALUE-BASED DECISION-MAKING: 
LEARNING AND TIME PREFERENCE 
Marieta Pehlivanova 
Joseph W. Kable 
 
Human decisions are strongly influenced by past experience or by the subjective values 
attributed to available choice options. Although decision processes show some common 
trends across individuals, they also vary considerably between individuals. The research 
presented in this dissertation focuses on two domains of decision-making, related to 
learning and time preference, and examines factors that explain decision-making 
differences between individuals. First, we focus on a form of reinforcement learning in a 
dynamic environment. Across three experiments, we investigated whether individual 
differences in learning were associated with differences in cognitive abilities, personality, 
and age. Participants made sequential predictions about an on-screen location in a video 
game. Consistent with previous work, participants showed high variability in their ability 
to implement normative strategies related to surprise and uncertainty. We found that 
higher cognitive ability, but not personality, was associated with stronger reliance on the 
normative factors that should govern learning. Furthermore, learning in older adults (age 
60+) was less influenced by uncertainty, but also less influenced by reward, a non-
normative factor that has substantial effects on learning across the lifespan. Second, we 
focus on delay discounting, the tendency to prefer smaller rewards delivered soon over 
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larger rewards delivered after a delay. Delay discounting has been used as a behavioral 
measure of impulsivity and is associated with many undesirable real-life outcomes. 
Specifically, we examined how neuroanatomy is associated with individual differences in 
delay discounting in a large adolescent sample. Using a novel multivariate method, we 
identified networks where cortical thickness varied consistently across individuals and 
brain regions. Cortical thickness in several of these networks, including regions such as 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and temporal pole, was negatively 
associated with delay discounting. Furthermore, this brain data predicted differences 
beyond those typically accounted for by other cognitive variables related to delay 
discounting. These results suggest that cortical thickness may be a useful brain phenotype 
of delay discounting and carry unique information about impulsivity. Collectively, this 
research furthers our understanding of how cognitive abilities, brain structure and healthy 
aging relate to individual differences in value-based decision-making. 
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CHAPTER 1 – Introduction 
 
Value-based decision-making: examples and main effects vs. individual differences  
In life, people make a multitude of decisions in the span of a single day, week, month, or 
even across many years. Some of these decisions involve choices rooted in preferences, 
such as choosing between spending available money now or saving for retirement or 
future consumption (time preference); or choosing between a risky but possibly profitable 
career move versus a less risky but also less beneficial alternative (risk preference); or 
choosing between an option of narrow-self interest and an option that may benefit 
another person or group (social preference). Alternatively, other decisions are more 
strongly rooted in learning from past experience, through trial and error, such as 
choosing a driving route based on previously experienced traffic and delays on specific 
roads. A large effort in the research field of decision-making has focused on studying the 
main effects of choices under different conditions, i.e. elucidating the behavioral 
principles and neural mechanisms of how people make decisions. To this end, relevant 
measures such as response rates, reaction times, or neural activation in response to task 
stimuli are typically averaged between different experimental conditions, while inter-
individual variability is treated as idiosyncratic noise (Kanai & Rees, 2011). For example, 
people tend to view losses more unfavorably than gains of the same magnitude, a 
phenomenon called loss aversion (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).  
Yet, one of the most consistent and salient observations in both everyday life and 
scientific inquiry is that people differ from each other in a variety of ways. In everyday 
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life, some differences are easily and immediately observable (for example, height), while 
others take time to uncover (e.g. personality or cognitive ability), and others may yet be 
inconspicuous to the naked eye (e.g. brain size). Within the scientific study of decision-
making, research has shown, for example, that people vary widely in the level of risk they 
accept in life (Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002) or in the degree to which they can delay 
gratification (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). The research presented in this 
dissertation aims at furthering our understanding of cognitive and neuroanatomical 
features that relate to individual differences in decision-making, specifically in the 
domains of learning and time preference. 
Sources of individual differences in differential psychology 
Differences between individuals that relate to psychological and behavioral 
characteristics have been studied within the purview of differential psychology. Here we 
consider the following major domains of individual differences between humans: 
cognitive abilities, personality and age (Kanai & Rees, 2011; Lubinski, 2000). One of the 
most consequential dimensions of human variability is general intelligence, a factor that 
subsumes variability in reasoning, mental processing speed, executive function and 
memory, and is measured by the intelligence quotient (IQ). Higher IQ is associated with 
higher educational achievement, successful job performance and functioning in modern 
life (Gottfredson, 1997) and decreased mortality (Batty, Deary, & Gottfredson, 2007), 
among other beneficial outcomes. Personality is another dimension of variability, with 
one prominent model (“Big Five”) identifying five traits along which humans vary: 
neuroticism, conscientiousness, agreeableness, extraversion, and openness (Costa & 
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McCrae, 1992). As measured by this model, personality is associated with differences in 
job performance (Barrick & Mount, 1991), health behaviors (McAdams & Donnellan, 
2009; Rhodes & Smith, 2006), and even political views (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, & 
Dowling, 2011) and predicts mortality, divorce, and occupational attainment at least as 
well as cognitive ability does (Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, & Goldberg, 2007). 
Finally, both cognition and personality change across the lifespan (Craik & Bialystok, 
2006; Specht, Egloff, & Schmukle, 2011), and healthy aging is generally associated with 
changes in decision-making, resulting from changes in neurophysiology, cognitive 
abilities and affective motivation (Samanez-Larkin & Knutson, 2015). 
Over the past couple of decades, differential psychology has increasingly begun to 
examine the brain anatomy and function underlying psychological differences among 
individuals. This process has been facilitated by advances in neuroimaging and further 
reinforced by discoveries that the individual difference factors described above may have 
a neurobiological basis and a genetic component, thus giving rise to the field of 
personality neuroscience (DeYoung & Gray, 2009). Indeed, general intelligence is linked 
to structural brain differences in frontal, temporal, and parietal lobes—where more gray 
matter or thicker cortex is associated with higher IQ— and is highly heritable (Deary, 
Penke, & Johnson, 2010; Haier, Jung, Yeo, Head, & Alkire , 2004). The study of 
personality has also yielded structural correlates of distinct Big Five traits (DeYoung et 
al., 2010) and evidence of heritability (Riemann, Angleitner, & Strelau, 1997). Among 
the above factors, perhaps the most significant source of neural variability is associated 
with age, as the human brain undergoes dramatic changes through childhood and 
4 
 
adolescence (Giedd et al., 1999; Lenroot et al., 2007) to healthy old age (Buckner, 2004; 
Raz et al., 2005). 
The following section will discuss cognition, personality, and age as sources of 
individual differences in specific decision-making tasks related to learning and time 
preference.  
Reinforcement learning and individual differences  
Brief background on reinforcement learning 
Much of human decision-making is based on learning from experience, through 
trial and error, so as to avoid unpleasant outcomes and achieve desirable ones. This 
phenomenon is known as reinforcement learning and has been robustly observed across 
species beyond humans. Early explorations of such learning came from the field of 
animal behavior. In a classical conditioning paradigm, an animal was repeatedly 
presented with a pairing of an initially neutral and unconditioned stimulus and a reward, 
such as food, which produces a natural response from the animal (Daw & Tobler, 2013; 
Pavlov, 1927). After repeated exposure to this pairing, the animal develops an implicit 
response to the (now conditioned) stimulus, even when the stimulus is presented without 
the reward. It was proposed that the animal learns the conditioned response based on 
comparisons between the observed reward and the expected/predicted reward based on 
prior experience (Bush & Mosteller, 1951). The difference between the two is termed the 
prediction error, and learning is greatest when that error is large. This observation gave 
rise to the Rescorla-Wagner model of classical conditioning (Rescorla and Wagner, 
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1972). According to this model, the animal updates its predictions in the direction of the 
prediction error and the extent of updating is governed by a parameter called the learning 
rate (constrained between 0 and 1, where larger values indicate updating towards more 
recent outcomes). Most of the work on the neural basis of reinforcement learning 
computations has focused on prediction errors. Prediction error-like signals have been 
associated with phasic activity of the midbrain dopamine neurons (Glimcher, 2011; 
Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997); over the course of learning stimulus-reward 
associations, dopamine neurons gradually become responsive to the reward-predicting 
stimulus, rather than the reward itself (Schultz et al., 1997). 
Adaptive learning 
In this dissertation, we will focus on a specific form of reinforcement learning that 
takes into account abrupt changes in the environment. Recent work has begun to 
characterize the principles of learning specifically in a changing environment (Behrens et 
al., 2007; Nassar et al., 2010; McGuire et al., 2014). We refer to such learning as 
“adaptive” because it allows and requires adapting one’s rate of learning to the type of 
environment. In a stable but noisy environment, long-run experience is the best predictor 
of the future, and it is reasonable to maintain a low learning rate favoring the averaged 
experienced outcomes (Behrens et al., 2007; Nassar et al., 2010). Conversely, in a 
volatile environment, characterized by unexpected changes, recent experience is the best 
predictor of the future, and it is reasonable to use a high learning rate such that the most 
recently experienced outcome is weighted more heavily. In such learning paradigms, 
people are generally sensitive to changes in the environment— they can detect volatility 
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and respond appropriately by using higher learning rates— but these adaptive tendencies 
vary widely across individuals (Behrens et al., 2007; McGuire et al., 2014; Nassar et al., 
2010).  
Individual differences in reinforcement learning 
In this section, I will review literature on individual difference factors, as outlined 
above, that have been found to explain variability in reinforcement learning.  
Cognitive factors. Some work has been done in a framework that distinguishes 
between two learning algorithms: “model-based” versus “model-free” learning. In this 
framework, model-free learning relies on simply repeating actions that have previously 
been rewarded without explicitly learning the structure of the reward environment (Daw, 
Niv, & Dayan, 2005). This is the type of learning mechanism that is encoded in 
dopaminergic neurons’ responses. In contrast, model-based learning relies on building a 
sophisticated mental model of the reward environment, evaluating choices in the context 
of that model, and flexibly updating one’s learning rate depending on the circumstances. 
Otto and colleagues (2013, 2014) have recently shown that better working memory and 
cognitive control are associated with increased reliance on model-based rather than 
model-free learning. In addition, high working memory capacity protects individuals 
against the deleterious effect of stress on model-based learning (Otto et al., 2013).  
Neural factors. Some work has also identified a neural basis of individual 
differences in reinforcement learning, specifically linked to the striatum, which is one of 
the main target areas of dopamine neurons coding for prediction errors. In a reward 
7 
 
learning task, individuals who were able to learn the reward contingencies of the task 
showed pronounced striatal activation in response to prediction errors, relative to those 
who were unable to learn, and the magnitude of activation was positively associated with 
performance across both groups (Schönberg, Daw, Joel, & O'Doherty, 2007). Another 
study has directly linked individual differences in learning to differences in baseline 
striatal dopamine synthesis capacity, such that individuals with high and low capacity 
show distinct patterns of responses to learning from rewards versus punishments in a 
reversal learning task (Cools et al., 2009). 
In adaptive learning specifically, prior work has reported psychophysiological and 
neural correlates of individual variability in learning. Pupil diameter tracks normative 
learning factors derived from a computational model, and the degree of pupil metrics’ 
sensitivity to environmental statistics reflects the extent to which a person’s behavior was 
influenced by these normative factors (Nassar et al., 2012). In an fMRI study, activity in 
the anterior insula and dorsomedial frontal cortex, regions linked to arousal and salience 
(Seeley et al., 2007), is modulated by these normative factors (McGuire et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, the extent to which activity in anterior insula and dorsomedial frontal cortex 
was modulated by these normative factors was associated with the extent to which a 
person’s behavior was influenced by these same factors (McGuire et al., 2014). 
 Personality. The literature on personality factors that explain individual variability 
in learning behavior is sparse. In particular, extraversion— a personality trait that has 
been hypothesized to relate to dopamine function— is associated with individual 
differences in learning, as measured by distinct EEG response patterns (Cooper, Duke, 
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Pickering, & Smillie, 2014; Smillie, Cooper, & Pickering, 2011). In an associative 
learning task, more extraverted individuals show a greater difference in sensitivity 
between unpredicted non-rewards and predicted rewards, compared to introverted 
individuals (Cooper et al., 2014; Smillie et al., 2011). 
Age. Reinforcement learning processes show age-related differences, with 
children and older adults generally able to learn reward contingencies, but learning more 
slowly and with more difficulty than adolescents and younger adults (Eppinger, Kray, 
Mock, & Mecklinger, 2008; Eppinger, Mock, & Kray, 2009; Hämmerer, Li, Müller, & 
Lindenberger, 2011). In old adults, some of these differences have been hypothesized to 
result from age-related changes in the dopaminergic and serotonergic systems (Marschner 
et al., 2005). Healthy aging is specifically associated with decreased sensitivity to reward 
in a probabilistic learning task, which is neurobiologically mediated by reduced white 
matter integrity in select prefrontal pathways (Samanez-Larkin et al., 2012).  
Important open questions in individual differences in adaptive learning 
As outlined above, most of the work on individual differences in reinforcement 
learning has been done in paradigms that do not explicitly model fundamental changes in 
the environment. Differentiating between variability due to changes as apposed to noise 
is an important skill, and people vary in their degree of adaptability in dynamic 
environments— some people are quick learners in the face of change, while others 
require more time and experience to adapt. Given that most realistic environments 
humans experience, such as relationships, the work place or financial markets, are rarely 
stable over time, understanding factors that explain variability in individuals’ decision-
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making in dynamic environments is important. Previous individual difference work in the 
adaptive learning framework has indentified psychophysiological (Nassar et al., 2012) 
and neural correlates (McGuire et al., 2014) of variability. However, differences have not 
been examined in the context of other factors that are generally known to relate to inter-
individual variability, such as cognitive and personality factors. In addition, healthy aging 
could be an important source of individual differences, as it is associated with changes in 
personality (Roberts & Mroczek, 2008) and cognition (McArdle, Ferrer-Caja, Hamagami, 
& Woodcock, 2002), possibly mediated by neurological age-dependent changes 
(Marschner et al., 2005). Alternatively, age may play a role in adaptive learning 
independently of changes in the above factors. The systematic study of these factors 
together could be fruitful, as it will allow us to study the adaptive learning process in its 
complexity. Accordingly, here we extend the study of individual differences in adaptive 
learning by investigating the effect of cognitive abilities, personality, and age on learning 
strategies.  
Time preference: delay discounting and individual differences  
In adaptive learning, the decision-maker is influenced by the past, and recent 
outcomes compete with more distant ones to shape current expectations about the 
environment. Next, we transition to another domain of decision-making— time 
preference— where decisions are in turn based on the influence of the recent or 
immediate versus distant future.  
Introduction to delay discounting 
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In the domain of preference, this dissertation specifically focuses on time 
preference which entails a choice between receiving something desirable soon and 
receiving something desirable after some time. This type of decision is common in real 
life and consists of a comparative evaluation of costs and benefits of options occurring at 
different points in time. For example, a student has a choice between playing video 
games now and using that time to study for the SAT, which might lead to a larger return 
on investment in the future; an employee has a choice between using their discretionary 
income for hobbies or leisure now or investing that income for larger future monetary 
returns. Such intertemporal choices have been studied in the laboratory using a paradigm 
called “delay discounting” (DD), which measures the degree to which people “discount” 
the value of rewards received after a delay (Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999). The DD task 
consists of a series of questions of the type “Would you rather receive $10 now or $18 in 
30 days?” By varying the amounts and delays, one can estimate the subjective discount 
rate at which each individual devalues future outcomes. The discount rate (DR) estimates 
the steepness of the reduction of present value with increases in delays. Individuals with 
higher DRs are considered more impulsive, while individuals with low DRs are 
considered patient. DD is particularly fruitful for the study of individual differences for 
the following reasons: First, there exists large variability between individuals in the 
degree of discounting. Second, behavioral variability on this lab task predicts variability 
in many real-life behaviors, including addiction. Third, DD has been used extensively as 
a measure of impulsivity. 
Delay Discounting, real-life outcomes, and relation to impulsivity 
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A large body of literature has shown that discount rates measured in the lab 
correlate with consequential real-life behaviors and outcomes. Higher discounting is 
associated with relationship infidelity (Reimers, Maylor, Stewart, & Chater, 2009), lower 
creditworthiness (Meier & Sprenger, 2012), and poor health habits and obesity (Amlung, 
Petker, Jackson, Balodis, & MacKillop, 2016; Chabris, Laibson, Morris, Schuldt, & 
Taubinsky, 2008). Conversely, lower discounting is associated with greater life 
satisfaction (Becker, Deckers, Dohmen, Falk, & Kosse, 2012) greater social competence 
in adolescents (Mischel et al., 1989), and higher GPA in college students (Kirby, 
Winston, & Santiesteban, 2005). The largest literature on the real-life correlates of delay 
discounting comes from the field of addiction research (see MacKillop et al., 2011 for a 
meta-analysis and Reynolds, 2006 for a qualitative review). Higher discounting has been 
reliably associated with smoking (Epstein et al., 2003; Reynolds, 2004; Reynolds, 
Richards, Horn, & Karraker, 2004); with higher and/or problematic alcohol use 
(Courtney et al., 2012; Petry, 2001a; Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998); with heroin and 
cocaine addiction (Coffey, Gudleski, Saladin, & Brady, 2003; Kirby et al., 1999; Kirby & 
Petry, 2004; Madden, Petry, Badger, & Bickel, 1997); and with pathological gambling 
(Petry, 2001b). In the aggregate, greater discounting of future rewards appears to be 
robustly related to less desirable outcomes, while low discounting appears to be 
associated with more desirable outcomes. 
Impulsivity is defined as a tendency to act without deliberation or adequate regard 
for consequences (Evenden, 1999). DD has been proposed as a model of impulsivity, 
where steady preference for immediate rewards is considered impulsive whereas steady 
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preference for delayed rewards is interpreted as a display of self-control (Ainslie, 1975). 
DD has also specifically been proposed as a framework for understanding substance 
abuse as an impulsive choice of an immediate reward over the more patient and 
beneficial choice of abstinence (Bickel et al., 2007). 
Individual differences in delay discounting 
In this section, I will review individual difference factors that have been found to 
explain variability in discount rates among people.  
Cognitive factors. In relation to cognitive factors, lower discounting is robustly 
associated with higher intelligence (Shamosh and Gray, 2008), and also with better 
working memory (Shamosh et al., 2008; Bobova et al., 2009). As a potential neural 
mechanism of these associations, Shamosh and colleagues (2008) found that working 
memory-related activity in anterior prefrontal cortex partially mediates the relationship 
between DD and IQ.  
Personality. In contrast, relationships between personality traits and DD appear to 
be less stable. High extraversion (characterized by an orientation towards people and 
external events), high agreeableness (characterized by a tendency to act in a cooperative 
manner), and low conscientiousness (characterized by a tendency to be less organized 
and responsible) have been reported to predict steeper discounting (Anderson, Burks, 
DeYoung, & Rustichini, 2011; Becker et al., 2012; Daly, Harmon, & Delaney, 2009; 
Ostaszewski, 1996), though replication of these effects has been inconsistent (Becker et 
al., 2012; Dohmen et al., 2010). Interestingly, some research has also examined the 
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interaction of cognitive abilities and personality in predicting discount rates (Hirsh, 
Morisano, & Peterson, 2008). At the low end of the cognitive ability distribution, high 
extraversion and low neuroticism, defined as emotional stability, predict higher 
discounting, while at the high end extraversion has no effect and high neuroticism is 
associated with steeper discounting (Hirsh et al., 2008). Traits related to time perception 
also appear to play a role in temporal discounting (Kim & Zauberman, 2009): feeling 
weak connectedness to one’s future self (Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2009a; 2009b) is 
associated with steeper discounting. Both differences in time perception and future 
connectedness have been associated with differences in brain activity (Cooper, Kable, 
Kim, & Zauberman, 2013; Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2009b).  
Age. Multiple studies have examined age as a source of individual differences in 
DD. One of the earliest such investigations reported that young adults were lower 
discounters than children but higher discounters than older adults, suggesting a linear 
decrease in discounting across age groups (Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994). Despite these 
differences, though, the mechanism of choice in DD appears to be qualitatively similar 
across age groups (Green et al, 1994). However, reports about discounting differences 
between young and old adults are inconsistent. In addition to several studies reporting 
that older adults are lower discounters compared to young adults (Eppinger, Nystrom, & 
Cohen, 2012; Green et al., 1994; Reimers et al., 2009), there is evidence of old adults 
being higher discounters (Read & Read, 2004), as well as reports of no differences 
between these age groups (Chao, Szrek, Pereira, & Pauly, 2009; Samanez-Larkin et al., 
2011). Notably, Read and Read (2004) reported a curvilinear relationship between adult 
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age and DD, such that elderly adults (average age of 75) discounted more steeply than 
young adults (average age of 25), with middle-aged adults (average age of 44) exhibiting 
the lowest discount rates. In youth, age differences have been reported, such that younger 
adolescents are higher discounters that older adolescents (Olson, Hooper, Collins, & 
Luciana, 2007; Scheres et al., 2006; Steinberg et al., 2009). 
Brain structure. A number of studies with adults have investigated individual 
differences in DD in relation to neuroanatomy. Negative associations between gray 
matter volume and discounting have been found in lateral prefrontal cortex (Bjork et al., 
2009), superior frontal gyrus (Schwartz et al., 2010), putamen (Dombrovski et al., 2012; 
Cho et al., 2013); and positive associations have been found in posterior cingulate cortex 
(PCC) and ventral striatum (Schwartz et al., 2010), medial prefrontal regions and anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC, Cho et al., 2013), middle frontal gyrus and frontal pole (Wang et 
al., 2016). Decreased CT in medial prefrontal cortex and ACC is associated with higher 
discounting (Bernhardt et al., 2014). Generally, these results have been inconsistent in 
terms of directionality and regional specificity of effects, and might have been limited by 
small or clinical samples, and region-of-interest analyses (for a review see Kable & Levy, 
2015).  
Important open questions in individual differences in delay discounting 
The neurofunctional correlates of DD have been characterized extensively (Bartra, 
McGuire, & Kable, 2013; Clithero & Rangel, 2013; Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Peters & 
Büchel, 2011), and some research has begun to investigate its neurostrcutural correlates. 
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However, most of the previous work relating brain structure to DD has been conducted 
with adult samples, and it is unclear whether documented age differences in DD might 
also contribute to differences in neurostructural correlates. Such differences are 
especially important to consider in relation to adolescence because this developmental 
period is characterized by dramatic structural brain changes which may contribute to 
increased impulsivity (Giedd et al., 1999; Sowell et al., 2004; Van Leijenhorst et al., 
2010), as well as changes in cognitive abilities, such as intelligence and executive 
function (Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006; McArdle, Ferrer-Caja, Hamagami, & 
Woodcock, 2002), which are associated with DD. In addition, delay discounting, as a 
behavioral measure of impulsivity, has been associated with many risky behaviors, such 
as reckless driving and alcohol abuse, which are an acute source of morbidity in 
adolescence (Eaton et al., 2011). Here we extend the study of individual differences in 
DD by investigating how differences in neuroanatomy, specifically cortical thickness, 
relate to variability in discounting in adolescence.  
Research overview  
This dissertation specifically focuses on investigating individual differences in 
two types of value-based decision-making processes: adaptive learning and delay 
discounting. Both of these processes involve processing time-dependent information: in 
learning, the decision-maker incorporates information from the past to accurately 
estimate the current expectations about the environment, while in delay discounting the 
decision-maker incorporates information about delays into the future. Conversely, the 
processes differ in that adaptive learning is based on experienced outcomes, whereas 
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delay discounting is based on preference rather than experience. Understanding the 
factors that contribute to individual differences in these processes is important because 
successful functioning in the world depends on the abilities to detect changes in one’s 
environment, delay gratification and accumulate resources for future consumption. 
In Chapter 2, in a series of three behavioral experiments, we investigate whether 
individual differences in adaptive learning are associated with differences in cognitive 
abilities, personality, and age. In a simple video game task, participants make sequential 
predictions about an on-screen location. This task provides trial-by-trial learning rate 
estimates and has been successfully used in eliciting individual differences in learning 
behavior (Nassar et al., 2010, 2012, 2016; McGuire et al., 2014). In addition, the task has 
an underlying computational model, which has characterized two distinct normative 
factors that should drive learning: change-point probability, which is related to how 
surprising and unexpected a new outcome is, and relative uncertainty, which tracks the 
reliability of the current beliefs about the state of the environment (Wilson et al., 2010; 
Nassar et al., 2010, 2012). Consistent with previous work, we find that participants 
exhibit common strategies in adaptive learning but also show large individual differences 
in implementing these strategies. We find that increased cognitive ability is associated 
with stronger reliance on the normative factors that should govern learning in this task. In 
contrast, we find no reliable evidence that personality traits, including trait anxiety, 
influence learning strategies in this dynamic environment. Furthermore, we find that 
adaptive learning in older adults (age 60+) is less influenced by relative uncertainty, but 
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also less influenced by reward, a non-normative factor that has substantial effects on 
adaptive learning across the lifespan. 
In Chapter 3, we examine neuronatomy, specifically cortical thickness, as a 
source of individual differences in delay discounting in large sample of adolescents. 
Using a novel multivariate method, we describe networks where cortical thickness varies 
consistently across individuals and brain regions. Cortical thickness in several of these 
networks of regions shows a negative relationship with impulsivity, such that diminished 
cortical thickness is associated with greater discounting. The strongest effects were found 
in regions typically implicated in delay discounting, such as ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex and orbitofrontal cortex. Brain data predicted differences in discounting above and 
beyond cognitive variables typically found to correlate with delay discounting. 
Combined, these results suggest that cortical thickness may be a useful brain phenotype 
of delay discounting and carry unique information about impulsivity. 
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CHAPTER 2 — Age and cognitive abilities predict learning in a 
dynamic environment 
 
Abstract 
 
People are adaptive learners in a changing environment and are able to update their 
beliefs using relevant cues about the state of the world. Despite common trends in 
behavior, there is great variability in participants’ learning strategies. Across three 
experiments, we investigate cognitive abilities, personality, and age as potential sources 
of these individual differences. In a simple video game task, participants made sequential 
predictions about an on-screen location. This task provides estimates of trial-by-trial 
learning rates and has been successfully used in eliciting individual differences in 
learning behavior. In addition, the task has an underlying computational model, which 
has characterized two distinct normative factors that should drive learning: change-point 
probability, which is related to how surprising a new outcome is, and relative 
uncertainty, which tracks the reliability of the current beliefs about the state of the 
environment. Consistent with previous work, we found that participants exhibit common 
strategies in adaptive learning but also show large individual differences in implementing 
these strategies. We found that increased cognitive ability, and specifically better 
memory performance, is associated with stronger reliance on the normative factors that 
should govern learning in this task. In contrast, we found no reliable evidence that 
personality traits influence learning strategies in a dynamic environment. Furthermore, 
adaptive learning in older adults (age 60+) was less influenced by relative uncertainty, 
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consistent with previous reports, but also less influenced by reward, a non-normative 
factor that has substantial effects on adaptive 
 
 Introduction 
 
Imagine dining at the same restaurant on repeated occasions and having delicious 
meals, making it your favorite place to dine. Unexpectedly, on one particular occasion 
they serve you a bad meal. Is this negative experience just an unfortunate exception in an 
otherwise stable but noisy world, or does it indicate that something fundamental about the 
restaurant has changed, such as a new chef? How much you should update your beliefs in 
response to new experiences depends on the stability of the environment. In an 
environment that is stable but noisy, long-run experience is the best predictor of the 
future, and beliefs should be updated minimally in the face of new evidence (Behrens, 
Woolrich, Walton, & Rushworth, 2007; Nassar, Wilson, Heasly, & Gold, 2010). In this 
case, if a restaurant has a reliable and stable history with the same chef, it is sensible to 
disregard the occasional negative experience if you have had a steady streak of good 
meals there. Conversely, in a volatile environment, characterized by unexpected changes, 
recent experience is the best predictor of the future, and beliefs should be updated more 
rapidly in the face of new data (Behrens et al., 2007; Nassar et al., 2010). In this case, if a 
restaurant has gone through many chef changes recently, a surprisingly negative 
experience is more likely to mean that another change has occurred. Recent work has 
shown that, while on average people follow these strategies, individuals differ 
substantially in the extent to which they adhere to these principles of “adaptive learning” 
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(Behrens et al., 2007; McGuire, Nassar, Gold, & Kable, 2014; Nassar et al., 2010). 
However, the different factors that might influence these individual differences in 
adaptive learning have not been systematically studied. Here we investigate cognitive 
abilities, personality, and age as possible sources of these individual differences.  
A learning model derived from Bayesian theory has characterized two distinct 
normative factors that should drive learning in volatile environments, and individual 
differences in adaptive learning can be described by variability in responding to these 
normative factors (McGuire et al., 2014; Nassar, Bruckner, Gold, Li, Heekeren, & 
Eppinger, 2016; Nassar, Rumsey, Wilson, Parikh, Heasly, & Gold, 2012; Nassar et al., 
2010; Wilson, Nassar, & Gold, 2010). The first factor, which we call change-point 
probability, tracks the likelihood of a fundamental shift in the environment and is related 
to how surprising and unexpected a new outcome is (Nassar et al., 2012). In the 
restaurant example, a meal of unexpected quality, relative to one’s experience, might 
suggest that something important about the restaurant has changed. The second factor, 
which we call relative uncertainty, tracks the uncertainty, and thus reliability, of the 
current beliefs about the state of the environment, and is related to the number of 
observed outcomes consistent with the current state (Nassar et al., 2012). In the restaurant 
example, the longer the streak of delicious meals, the more confident you are of the 
quality of the meals under the current chef. Though on average individuals update their 
beliefs in a dynamic environment according to both of these factors, there is large inter-
individual variability in doing so (Nassar et al., 2012; McGuire et al., 2014).  
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What accounts for these individual differences in sensitivity to relevant 
environmental cues? To date, studies have identified associations between individual 
differences in adaptive learning and psychophysiological and neural activity linked to 
arousal systems. Pupil diameter reflects both normative factors described above, with 
evoked changes in pupil diameter tracking change-point probability and average baseline 
pupil diameter tracking relative uncertainty (Nassar et al., 2012). Furthermore, the degree 
of pupil metrics’ sensitivity to environmental statistics predicted the extent to which a 
person’s behavior was influenced by the normative factors (Nassar et al., 2012). In an 
fMRI study, activity in the anterior insula and dorsomedial frontal cortex, regions linked 
to arousal and salience (Seeley et al., 2007), was modulated by both change-point 
probability and relative uncertainty (McGuire et al., 2014). Furthermore, the extent to 
which activity in anterior insula and dorsomedial frontal cortex was modulated by these 
normative factors was associated with the extent to which a person’s behavior was 
influenced by these same factors (McGuire et al., 2014).  
Here we extend these findings in a series of three behavioral experiments 
investigating whether individual differences in adaptive learning are associated with 
differences in cognitive abilities, personality, and age. There are strong reasons to 
hypothesize that each of these classic individual difference variables might influence 
adaptive learning. Cognitive abilities are associated with individual differences in many 
decision-making and learning tasks (Burks, Carpenter, Goette, & Rustichini, 2009; Otto, 
Skatova, Madlon-Kay, & Daw, 2014; Shamosh & Gray, 2008) but have not been 
explicitly studied in adaptive learning. Given that sensitivity to relevant cues from the 
environment is associated with arousal responses (Nassar et al., 2012), personality and 
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trait-based affect may influence adaptive learning. Indeed, a recent report links high trait 
anxiety with a reduced ability to adjust learning between stable and volatile environments 
(Browning, Behrens, Jocham, O'Reilly, & Bishop, 2015). Healthy aging is also associated 
with changes in decision-making, resulting from changes in neurophysiology, cognitive 
abilities and affective motivation (Samanez-Larkin & Knutson, 2015). In particular, 
Nassar et al. (2016) have shown that learning from uncertainty in a dynamic environment 
is reduced in older, relative to younger, adults. Here we systematically explore the 
interplay of cognitive abilities, personality, and aging on adaptive learning.  
Consistent with previous reports (Nassar et al., 2010, 2012; McGuire et al., 2014), 
we found that people exhibited common strategies in adaptive learning, but also showed 
large individual differences in implementing these strategies. We found that increased 
cognitive ability, and specifically better memory performance, is associated with stronger 
reliance on the normative factors that should govern learning in this task. In contrast, we 
found no reliable evidence that personality traits, including trait anxiety, influence 
learning strategies in a dynamic environment. Finally, we found that adaptive learning in 
older adults (age 60+) is less influenced by relative uncertainty, consistent with previous 
reports (Nassar et al., 2016), but also less influenced by reward, a non-normative factor 
that has substantial effects on adaptive learning across the lifespan. 
 
Experiment 1: Method 
 
Participants. The experimental protocol was approved by the University of 
Pennsylvania Internal Review Board. Informed consent was obtained from all 
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participants. We recruited 49 participants for this experiment (age 18–34, M = 25.5, SD = 
4.7; 33% males) from the University of Pennsylvania and the surrounding local 
community. Inclusion criteria included comfort with using a right-handed trackball and 
fluency in English. Exclusion criteria included a history of alcohol or drug abuse, major 
psychiatric disorders not in remission for > 6 months, and current use of psychotropic 
medications (including antidepressants, anxiolytics, and antipsychotics). 
Procedure. Participants first completed a variant of a predictive inference task that 
we have previously used to study adaptive learning, the “helicopter task,” which is 
described in more detail below. Subsequently, participants’ IQ was assessed with the 
similarities and matrix reasoning subtests of the Wechsler Abbreviated Intelligence Scale 
(WASI; Wechsler, 1999). Finally, participants completed the Big Five Inventory-44 
(John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991), Brief Sensation Seeking Scale (Hoyle, Stephenson, 
Palmgreen, Lorch, & Donohew, 2002), and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) trait 
subscale (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) via Qualtrics (Qualtrics 
Labs Inc., Provo, UT). We also administered an intertemporal choice task (Senecal, 
Wang, Thompson, & Kable, 2012) for exploratory purposes, and do not describe the 
results of that task here. All tests were administered by the same experimenter (MP), in 
the same manner, and in the same testing room. One notable exception to the 
experimental protocol is that we started administering the STAI trait subscale mid-data 
collection upon becoming aware of Browning et al.’s (2015) reported anxiety effects on 
adaptive learning. We retroactively collected the anxiety data for the first half of our 
sample via an online survey. 
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Helicopter Task. Participants performed four blocks (150 trials each) of a 
predictive-inference task in which learning rates can be tracked trial-by-trial (Nassar et 
al., 2010, 2012, 2016; McGuire et al., 2014). The task was programmed in Matlab (The 
MathWorks, Natick, MA) using MGL (http://justingardner.net/mgl) and snowDots 
(https://code.google.com/archive/p/snow-dots/) extensions. On every trial, participants 
made a prediction about the mean of an underlying generative distribution based on 
observed random draws from that distribution. The task was presented as a computer 
game with the following description: a helicopter in the sky drops a bag of coins on each 
trial; once the bag reaches the ground, it turns into a coin explosion, and the participant’s 
job is to position a bucket on the ground prior to the bag fall to collect as many coins as 
possible (Figure 1A). Importantly, the helicopter is hidden in clouds, so participants must 
use previously observed bag drop locations to infer the helicopter’s position. Participants 
made trial-by-trial predictions about the location of the helicopter by positioning the 
rectangular bucket using a trackball. At the beginning of every trial, the bucket was re-
positioned to its default position in the middle of the screen. Once a participant submitted 
their prediction, they could not move the bucket until the bag-drop outcome was realized. 
Participants were instructed that the best strategy to maximize earnings is to position the 
bucket directly underneath the helicopter, even when the helicopter is obscured by 
clouds, thus implicitly discouraging guessing of individual bag drop locations. 
Participants received feedback on every trial in the form of a red bar spanning the 
difference between the bag drop location and the selected bucket position, indicating the 
prediction error (PE). This feedback was added to minimize the working memory burden 
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in this inference problem. The helicopter location changed occasionally, without warning, 
giving rise to unsignaled change points (CPs). 
Possible bag drop and bucket locations were mapped onto arbitrary screen units 
valued from 0 to 300. Bag drop locations were drawn at random from a Normal 
distribution around the center of the helicopter. The mean of the distribution, and thus the 
helicopter position, was held fixed on most trials (with 100% probability for the first 3 
trials in a new location). Occasionally there were unsignaled change points: with a .125 
probability after the third stable trial, the mean of the generative distribution was re-
drawn from a uniform distribution on (0, 300). The standard deviation of the distribution 
of bag drops varied between blocks and was set to either 10 or 25 screen units, creating 
different levels of noise in the environment. Participants were instructed to think of this 
noise as different strengths of “wind” which occasionally blew the bags away from the 
center of the helicopter. The width of the bucket scaled with the strength of the wind, and 
was set to 2.5 and 2.2 times the SD of the bag drop distribution, in the low and high wind 
conditions, respectively. The width of the bucket was chosen to balance earnings between 
different noise blocks, and the set of other parameter values were chosen based on 
simulations seeking to maximize the difference in payoff between an approximately 
Bayesian learning model (described below) and an observer that uses the simple strategy 
of placing the bucket at the location of the last bag drop. The main part of the task 
consisted of four blocks (150 trials each) alternating in wind strength, with the type of the 
first block (low vs. high wind/noise) counterbalanced across participants.  
The task also included a manipulation of reward with each bag containing one of 
two colors of coins, determined independently at random with 50% probability on each 
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trial. For half the participants, yellow coins were rewarded and gray coins were 
unrewarded. For the remaining participants, the colors were flipped with gray coins being 
rewarded and yellow coins being unrewarded. The rewarded color was also 
counterbalanced across participants and participants were assigned to one of the four 
conditions obtained by crossing the factors initial noise level and rewarded color. 
Participants were told which color would be rewarded, and were specifically instructed 
that (1) they will not see the coin color until after they have made a bucket prediction and 
observed the bag fall; (2) the color of the coin should not influence their strategy in the 
game. All rewarded coins gathered were redeemed for money. Participants received 
feedback after each block in the form of a percentage score indicating the participant’s 
earnings relative to earnings obtained by the approximate Bayesian learning model 
described in the following section. 
Prior to the four experimental blocks, participants completed a training session 
that was more extensive than in earlier versions of the task (Nassar et al., 2012; McGuire 
et al., 2014). The training built understanding of the environment by gradually 
introducing more complexity, such as wind, clouds and changes in the helicopter’s 
position. In the first training block, the helicopter was visible, fixed and the bag always 
dropped right underneath the helicopter (i.e. no wind); participants were simply required 
to repeatedly position the bucket underneath the helicopter to ensure they can manipulate 
the trackball. This first block was performed to criterion: 15 consecutive trials where the 
center of bucket was positioned within 12 screen units of the helicopter position. In the 
second training block of 25 trials, a distribution of bag drops with SD = 10 units around 
the helicopter center was introduced and explained to participants as “wind.” The third 
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block was 35 trials of a “windier” condition with SD = 25 units and a larger bucket, 
conditions that were maintained throughout the remainder of the training session. In the 
fourth block of 40 trials we introduced clouds on about half the trials (randomly 
determined on each trial); the clouds obscured the stationary helicopter from view. In the 
following two blocks of 50 trials each it was cloudy at all times, so participants never saw 
the helicopter and had to infer its position based on observed bag drops. In the next block 
of 50 trials the clouds were fully removed to make visible occasional shifts of the 
helicopter (i.e., change points were added). In the final training block of 60 trials, 
participants experienced high wind, clouds at all times, and occasional change points, and 
the only difference from the experimental blocks was that there was only one type of 
coin. The unrewarded coins of different color were introduced in the main experimental 
blocks. Participants did not earn money from the training session. 
Normative Model. We used a well-described approximately Bayesian belief 
updating model to simulate (nearly) optimal performance in the helicopter task (Nassar et 
al., 2010, 2012, 2016; McGuire et al., 2014). The model computes trial-by-trial estimates 
of the location of the helicopter in the form of a delta-rule (Nassar et al., 2010, 2012, 
2016):  
 
Bt+1 = Bt + α t × δt                       (1) 
 
δt = Xt − Bt                     (2) 
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where Bt  and Bt+1 are beliefs about the current and next locations of the helicopter, 
respectively, Xt  is the current observed bag drop, δt  is the prediction error for the current 
trial, and at is the learning rate.  
The ideal observer infers the position of the helicopter, i.e., the mean of the 
distribution generating bag drops, from the positions of previously observed bag drops 
according to: 
 
p(µt X1:t ) =
p(X1:t µt )p(µt )
p(X1:t )                                      (3) 
where μt is the position of the helicopter on trial t, and X1:t denotes the locations of bag 
drops observed on trials 1 through t.  
The model posits that trial-by-trial learning rates are driven by two factors 
computed on every trial from the sequence of experienced bag drop locations (Figure 1B; 
Nassar et al., 2012, 2016). The first factor is change point probability (CPP, denoted as 
Ω), which measures the probability of the helicopter having switched locations since the 
last trial, given the observed prediction error. The second factor is relative uncertainty 
(RU, denoted as τ), which estimates the uncertainty in the exact location of the helicopter 
(often caused by a recent change point) as a function of the total uncertainty about the 
next bag drop. 
Trial-by-trial learning rate is computed according to:  
 
               (4) 
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Learning accelerates and favors recent outcomes when the estimated likelihood of 
a change point is high or when the uncertainty in the precise location of the helicopter is 
high. The effect of RU in determining the learning rate is highest when CPP is zero and, 
conversely, the effect of CPP is highest when uncertainty about the mean of the 
generative distribution is low.  
In a recent instantiation of this normative model (Nassar et al., 2016), these two 
factors are computed recursively by first estimating RU as follows: 
 
           (5) 
 
where Ωt , τt, and δt are, respectively, the change point probability, relative uncertainty 
and prediction error on the previous trial; σN is the standard deviation of the bag drop 
distribution (previously defined as “noise”). The numerator of Equation 5 denotes the 
variance of the predictive distribution over possible helicopter locations, and includes 
terms for the variability in the bag drop distribution (σN) weighted under conditions of a 
recent change point or a stable environment, respectively, as well as an adjustment term 
for the variance arising from the difference in means of these distributions (McGuire et 
al., 2014). The denominator in Equation 5 includes all the terms in the numerator, plus a 
term to account for the remaining total uncertainty, namely uncertainty arising strictly 
from variability in the distribution of bag drops (σN). Total uncertainty in bag locations in 
this environment is attributable to both uncertainty about the center of the helicopter 
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(numerator) and uncertainty about the standard deviation of the bag drop distribution 
around the helicopter center. Accordingly, RU is calculated as the proportion of total 
uncertainty about the next bag location that is due to having an imprecise estimate of the 
location of the helicopter (McGuire et al., 2014; Nassar et al., 2016). 
 To calculate CPP, the model considers whether the generative mean has been 
resampled. The overall probability of resampling is called the Hazard rate, denoted by H. 
CPP on every trial is then computed from H, relative uncertainty (τt), SD of the bag drop 
distribution (σN) and the current prediction error (δt) as follows (Nassar et al., 2012, 
2016): 
 
Ωt =
U(Xt 0,300)H
U(Xt 0,300)H + N(δt 0,σ N2 1−τ t )(1− H )
                                                                (6) 
 
where U(Xt|0,300) represents the probability of the current observation being randomly 
drawn from the possible helicopter locations and N(δt|0, σ2N/1- τt) is the likelihood of 
observing the current prediction error under the current predictive distribution. In 
principle, CPP is higher as the base-rate of change points increases; however, H in our 
experiment was held fixed throughout. Thus, CPP only depended on how unlikely an 
observed prediction error was under the current beliefs. 
We obtained trial-by-trial estimates of CPP and RU by fitting the model to the 
sequences of experienced prediction errors using the true values of the hazard rate (H = 
0.125) and noise in the generative distribution (SD = 10 or 25).  
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Behavioral Analysis. We used linear regression to test the effect of normative 
model factors and the non-normative reward factor on participants’ trial-by-trial bucket 
updates, an analysis strategy successfully used in recent work with this task (McGuire et 
al., 2014; Nassar et al., 2016). Specifically, our analysis of task behavior was closely 
modeled after that used by Nassar and colleagues (2016). In other work with this task 
(Nassar et al., 2010, 2012, 2016), the normative model was alternatively, or additionally, 
fit to subjects’ bucket predictions to infer latent variables, such as the baseline rate of 
change points. In contrast, here we simulated normative influences on behavior (trial-by-
trial CPP and RU; by fitting the normative model to the sequence of observed bag drops), 
and examined how those relate to actual participant behavior.  
We fit the regression models explaining behavior separately for each participant, 
combining data from all 4 experimental blocks. Each model included the following 
independent variables calculated for each trial: prediction error and the interaction 
between prediction error and CPP, RU, an indicator variable for noise (the SD of the bag 
distribution), reward value (1 for rewarded trial and 0 for non-rewarded trial), and the 
quadratic weighted distance from screen center (to adjust for bias towards the default 
bucket position in the center of the screen). All predictors were mean-centered. As 
discussed in Nassar et al. (2016), residuals from this regression scale with prediction 
errors, such that they are larger with larger absolute errors. To account for this violation 
of regression assumptions, we used weighted linear regression, as described in Nassar et 
al. (2016). In an initial regression, we estimated the variance of residuals in sliding 
windows of prediction error. The variance estimates were used to weight errors; in 
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addition, a ridge penalty was applied to shrink estimated coefficients. We used a sliding 
window method, where data were binned based on relative prediction error (absolute 
prediction error divided by the SD of the bag drop distribution), which indexed surprise. 
We applied the binning to account for a non-monotonic relationship between updating 
and surprise. Each bin contained 10% of the total data and bins were incremented by one 
percentile of the data. For further details on analysis strategy, refer to Nassar et al. 
(2016).  
The regression coefficients for each independent variable in the above-described 
model were taken as the effects of each factor on the participant’s updates. Group effects 
across participants for each factor were tested against zero using Wilcoxon signed-rank 
tests. We then tested the CPP, RU and reward effects for association with personality and 
cognitive variables of interest. In our and previous studies (McGuire et al., 2014), the 
CPP and RU effects were strongly positively correlated; we therefore averaged them into 
a “Normative Learning Factor” (NLF) to use in a first step analysis and minimize the 
number of tests conducted. We used separate regression models with NLF as the 
dependent variable and either the cognitive or personality factors as independent 
variables to test the separate associations with personality and cognition. We used F-tests 
to formally compare a full model of personality and cognitive predictors to a nested 
model with just the cognitive variable, IQ, thus testing if personality predicts normative 
learning above and beyond cognition. 
Although the CPP and RU effects are strongly conceptually and quantitatively 
related, prior work has also shown some distinctions between the two (McGuire et al., 
2014; Nassar et al., 2016). In cases where we found significant associations with 
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normative learning, we further unpacked these effects by looking at bivariate correlations 
between the CPP and RU effects and the significant individual difference variables. We 
used Spearman’s rho for all reported correlations, to account for slight non-normality, 
especially in the cognitive and personality variables.  
 
Experiment 1: Results 
 
In this experiment, we investigated whether cognitive or personality factors explain 
individual differences in adaptive learning in young participants. 
Model-free analyses showed that participants’ learning was sensitive to normative 
model factors. Specifically, we examined if trial-by-trial learning was responsive to: (1) 
different magnitudes of spatial prediction error, and (2) sudden changes in the 
environment. 
Both of these factors have previously been shown to influence belief updating in a 
changing environment (Nassar et al., 2010, 2012). Consistent with previous findings, 
participants’ learning rates increased monotonically as the prediction error increased, in 
both low- and high-noise blocks (Figure 2A). Learning rates were also higher in the low-
noise blocks than in the high-noise blocks for an equivalent PE magnitude (Figure 2A; 
median p across prediction error bins < .0001). Combined, these results show that 
participants are sensitive to CPP, as CPP increases with prediction error and is greater for 
low noise than high noise for a fixed PE (Nassar et al., 2012). Also consistent with 
previous findings, participants used the highest learning rates on trials right after a change 
point, and learning rates decreased steeply thereafter, stabilizing around the third trial 
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post change point (Figure 2B). This result shows that participants are also sensitive to 
RU, as RU peaks after a change point and declines thereafter (Nassar et al., 2012). 
We used model-based analyses to further quantify how behavior depended on 
both normative and other incidental factors (Nassar et al., 2016). Trial-by-trial bucket 
update was the dependent variable, and the regression model included trial-wise PE, and 
the interaction between PE and CPP, RU, and reward as independent variables. The 
regression coefficients are a measure of the influence of that factor on each participant’s 
learning behavior, controlling for the influence of the other factors in the regression 
model. Consistent with previous reports (McGuire et al., 2014; Nassar et al., 2016), 
participants, as a group, made larger updates based on both CPP (Mdn = 0.37, Q1 = 0.22, 
Q3 = 0.50) and RU (Mdn = 0.19, Q1 = 0.07, Q3 = 0.32), with both group effects being 
significantly different from zero (Z = -6.02 and Z = -5.03, respectively, ps < .0001; Figure 
2C). Consistent with their normative roles, both CPP- and RU-based updating were 
positively correlated with total number of coins earned (rho = .70, p < .0001 and rho = 
.44, p = .002, respectively).  
Participants’ learning was not fully accounted for by the normative model, 
however. The normative model posits that learning is fully driven by CPP and RU 
(Nassar et al., 2012; 2016). In contrast, participants reliably updated based on the 
observed spatial prediction error alone, with higher PE engendering larger bucket updates 
(Mdn = 0.61, Q1 = 0.50, Q3 = 0.71, Z = -6.09, p < .0001). The regression coefficient on 
PE alone captures a tendency to rely on a fixed learning rate instead of learning 
adaptively according to the changing environment. Indeed, the tendency to update based 
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on PE alone is strongly negatively correlated with the tendency to update based on CPP 
or RU (rho = -.91 and rho = -.58, respectively, ps < .0001).  
Participants’ belief updating was also influenced by reward: participants updated 
more after trials with rewarded versus unrewarded coins (Mdn = 0.06, Q1 = 0.01, Q3 = 
0.10, Z = -5.00, p < .0001). Reward-based updating is non-normative in our task because 
the value of coins in each bag does not carry information about the distribution of bag 
locations. Accordingly, the reward effect was negatively correlated with number of coins 
earned (rho = -.29, p = .046), with those who were more influenced by bags with 
rewarded coins performing worse on the task. 
As is clear in Figure 2C, however, there were individual differences in the degree 
of normative updating. These individual differences were associated with cognitive but 
not personality measures. We used regression models to test the association between 
cognitive and personality factors and normative learning. The two normative behavioral 
effects, CPP and RU, were strongly positively correlated across participants (rho = .58, p 
< .0001; McGuire et al., 2014). Thus, to reduce the number of tests conducted, we used 
the average of the two effects (the “Normative Learning Factor”, NLF) as a dependent 
variable in the regression. A model with just IQ significantly predicted NLF (Table 1, 
F(1,47) = 6.82, p = .012), while a model only using personality measures did not 
significantly predict NLF (F(7,41) = 0.78, p = .61). A formal comparison of the full 
model (including cognitive—IQ—plus all personality measures) to a nested model with 
just IQ indicated that the nested model fits our data better than the full model (F(7,40) = 
0.63, p = .73). Higher IQ was associated with more adaptive learning (higher NLF, Table 
1, t(47) = 2.61, p = .012) and higher IQ was directly associated with better performance 
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(i.e., more total coins caught) in the game (rho = .50, p = .0003). To further unpack the 
effects of IQ, we examined the correlation between IQ and the normative model-based 
factors separately (CPP and RU). IQ was moderately positively correlated with both 
CPP- and RU- based updating (rho = .38, p = .006 and rho = .32, p = .027, respectively; 
Figures 2D and 2E), with higher IQ participants being more sensitive to these model-
based factors.  
However, IQ did not predict reward-based updating (F(1,47) = 0.49, p = .49; 
Figure 2F). Reward-based updating was also not significantly associated with personality 
measures (including “Big Five” dimensions of personality, sensation seeking, and trait 
anxiety; F(7,41) = 0.69, p = .68).   
 
Experiment 1: Discussion 
 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that learning behavior in a dynamic environment is 
influenced by normative factors from an approximate Bayesian model, and individual 
differences in normative learning correlate with cognitive abilities but not personality 
traits. Specifically, trial-by-trial surprise (CPP) and belief uncertainty (RU) increase 
learning from the most recent outcome (as shown previously in McGuire et al., 2014), 
and higher IQ participants show more sensitivity to these normative factors. Participants’ 
learning is also improperly influenced by incidental reward (McGuire et al., 2014); 
however, this tendency shows no association with cognitive abilities or personality.  
Cognitive abilities are an important source of individual differences and have 
been associated with decision-making across a variety of tasks. Cognitive abilities are 
37 
 
robustly correlated with temporal discounting—the tendency to devalue future rewards—
with higher IQ individuals exhibiting less discounting of delayed rewards (Shamosh & 
Gray, 2008). IQ is also associated with consistency in risky decisions, and in general with 
higher willingness to take calculated risks, perhaps due to an increased capacity to 
evaluate different options (Burks et al., 2009). Successful performance in our task 
requires inferring the underlying statistical structure of the environment from noisy 
evidence. Accurate inference could rely on cognitive abilities in a variety of different 
ways: it may reflect the ability to integrate abstract information from different sources 
(wind and helicopter movement; Gottfredson, 1997), or to actively maintain a 
representation of the environment, focusing attention on relevant information while 
ignoring the interference of noise (Kane & Engle, 2002). That is, though we observed a 
relationship between adaptive learning and IQ, measures of IQ do not isolate a single, 
specific cognitive process. Therefore, the relationship we observed might be traceable to 
the effects of specific cognitive processes, such as memory, which are correlated with IQ 
(Ackerman, Beier, & Boyle, 2005). We therefore examined associations with measures of 
more specific cognitive processes, in addition to the more general measure of IQ, in the 
following two experiments. 
We investigated several dimensions of personality (“Big Five” dimensions of 
personality, sensation seeking, and trait anxiety), and we did not find any association 
between personality traits and adaptive learning. We had hypothesized that traits such as 
neuroticism or anxiety might increase participants’ perceived rate of change points, and 
thus lead to overall increased learning rates (Nassar et al., 2012). High trait anxiety has 
been associated with reduced adjustment of learning rates between stable and volatile 
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periods in an aversive learning task (Browning et al., 2015). A notable difference 
between their study and ours—that might explain why we do not see an association with 
anxiety—is that they used anxiety-provoking electrical shocks as stimuli. 
In the next experiment, we set out to investigate if individual differences in 
adaptive learning are attributable to similar cognitive (versus personality) factors in a 
sample of elderly adults. This would replicate the findings of Experiment 1 and 
demonstrate their generalizability across the lifespan. Healthy aging itself might also 
influence performance in our task. Advanced age is associated with a decline in the 
ability to learn changing reward contingencies (Eppinger, Hämmerer, & Li, 2011), and a 
recent study with a different version of our predictive inference task showed that older 
participants exhibited a decreased sensitivity to uncertainty compared to young adults 
(Nassar et al., 2016).  
 
Experiment 2: Method 
 
In Experiment 2, we extended our investigation of cognitive and personality 
factors that influence adaptive learning in a sample of cognitively healthy older adults. 
Below (after Experiment 3), we will also use these data to consider healthy aging as a 
source of individual differences in adaptive learning by comparing performance between 
older and younger adults.  
Participants. We recruited 41 cognitively healthy older participants (age 60–84, M 
= 71.2, SD = 6.3; 32% males). Exclusion criteria were identical to those used in 
Experiment 1; inclusion criteria were further restricted to older adults who had been 
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screened as cognitively normal in the past 2 years. To this end, participants were 
recruited from a pool of cognitively normal controls followed as part of a larger 
longitudinal study at the University of Pennsylvania’s Alzheimer’s Disease Core Center 
(ADCC). All controls undergo longitudinal medical, neurologic and psychiatric 
assessments, as well as a standard battery of psychometric measures, including those 
described by the National Alzheimer’s Coordinating Center’s (NACC) Uniform Data Set 
(UDS; Morris et al., 2006). Additional psychometric measures included the Mini Mental 
State Examination (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975), Boston Naming Test 
(Williams, Mack, & Henderson, 1989), Trail Making Test (Crowe, 1998), Wechsler Digit 
Span Test (Wechsler, 1997), and the Consortium to Establish a Registry for Alzheimer’s 
Disease (CERAD) Word List Memory Test (Morris et al., 1989). Designation of 
cognitively normal is determined by a consensus group of neurologists, geriatricians, 
neuropsychologists, and psychiatrists at the ADCC.  Data from three participants were 
excluded because the participants were unable (N = 2) or refused (N = 1) to finish the 
task, so the effective sample size for analysis was 38 participants.  
Procedure. The experimenter, order of administration, and training session were 
the same as in Experiment 1, but there were several slight differences in procedure. 
Starting with the sixth participant, to reduce task fatigue, we cut the number of trials in 
each experimental block from 150 to 100 (a 33% reduction). We collected the same 
personality measures as in Experiment 1, except for the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(STAI) trait subscale (Spielberger et al., 1983). We offered participants the option to 
complete the questionnaires on paper in order to minimize computer use; five participants 
chose this option.  
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Although we did not collect any additional data from older adults at the time of 
testing, we were able to acquire measures of cognitive performance collected as part of 
their  participation in the ADCC. Psychometric testing was performed within a median of 
119 days (4 months) of testing in our experiment. Here, we specifically focus on the 
following measures: (a) total score from the Mini Mental State Examination, a 
questionnaire of cognitive impairment including questions about orientation, 
concentration, memory, and language; (b) total score from the Boston Naming Test, a test 
of identification of 30 objects presented as line drawings; (c) two timing measures from 
the Trail Making Test, a test of visual attention, processing speed, and mental flexibility. 
Participants are asked to sequentially connect 25 dots. In Part A, all dots contain numbers 
from 1 to 25, whereas Part B consists of alternating numbers and letters (1, A, 2, B, etc.). 
The timing measures for each part indicate time to successful completion of the task; (d) 
scores from the Wechsler Digit Span Test, a measure of short term memory. Participants 
are verbally presented with lists of digits and asked to repeat the digits in the presented 
order (forward test) or in reverse order (backward test). The number of digits increases by 
one until a participant fails two trials of the same length, such that scores indicate highest 
successfully repeated span lengths in each direction. (e) two memory measures derived 
from the Word List Memory task, a working memory and learning task. Participants are 
presented with a list of 10 high-frequency words which are read to them at a constant rate 
of 1 word every 2 seconds. The word list is presented 3 consecutive times, in randomized 
order. After every presentation, participants are asked to recall the words and responses 
are recorded. The first measure of memory performance is the total number of words 
immediately recalled across all three presentations (maximum is 30). The second measure 
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of memory performance is the total number of words recalled out of 10 after a delay. For 
one participant, Trail Making B score was not available at the time of collecting the other 
psychometric measures; we instead used a score obtained a year earlier. We note that 
reported results did not change when using a Trail Making B score imputed from other 
available cognitive variables.  
 
Experiment 2: Results and Discussion 
 
Model-free analyses in Experiment 2 revealed similar influences on learning rates 
as in Experiment 1 and previous reports (Nassar et al., 2010, 2012). Participants used 
higher learning rates with higher spatial prediction error and lower noise (Figure 3A; 
median p across prediction error bins = .0082), suggesting that learning was sensitive to 
the normative CPP factor (Nassar et al., 2012). Average learning rates peaked right after 
a change point and stabilized within three trials (Figure 3B), consistent with the 
normative influence of RU (Nassar et al., 2012).  
Model-based analyses further corroborated that older participants’ learning was 
sensitive to normative factors (Figure 3C; McGuire et al., 2014). Older participants, as a 
group, made larger updates based on the two normative factors, CPP (Mdn = 0.33, Q1 = 
0.22, Q3 = 0.47, Z = -5.36, p < .0001) and RU (Mdn = 0.18, Q1 = -0.02 , Q3 = 0.31, Z = -
2.99, p = .003). As with the younger participants in Experiment 1, the behavior of older 
participants in Experiment 2 also systematically departed from the normative model. 
Older participants’ updates showed a residual effect of observed spatial PE (Mdn = 0.65, 
Q1 = 0.47, Q3 = 0.71, Z = -5.37, p < .0001), suggesting that participants had some 
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tendency towards fixed learning rates rather than adapting learning rates based solely on 
CPP and RU. Reward also influenced belief updating: older participants updated more 
after trials with rewarded versus unrewarded coins (Mdn = 0.02, Q1 = -0.01, Q3 = 0.04, Z 
= -2.53, p = .011). 
Similar to our results in young adults, individual differences in adaptive learning 
in older adults were more strongly associated with cognitive than personality measures. 
We again examined the separate effects of cognitive (IQ and cognitive performance) and 
personality variables (“Big Five” personality and sensation seeking) on the Normative 
Learning Factor (average of CPP and RU). A model with cognitive measures alone 
significantly predicted NLF (Table 2, F(9,28)= 3.17, p = .009), while a model with only 
personality measures did not significantly predict NLF (F(6,31) = 0.47, p = .82). The 
nested model with just cognitive variables was preferred over the full model with both 
cognitive and personality variables (F(6,22) = 1.25, p = .32). In this regression model, 
unlike in the sample of young adults in Experiment 1, IQ was not a significant predictor 
of adaptive learning (Table 2, t(28) = -0.767, p = .45). However, several other cognitive 
variables were significantly associated with adaptive learning (Table 2). Namely, two 
measures of memory performance— Digit Span forward score (t(28) = 2.54, p = .017) 
and Total Recall from the Word List Memory task (t(28) = 2.05, p = .049) — as well as 
Trail Making B score (t(28) = 2.05, p = .0498).   
Unpacking these cognitive effects on adaptive learning, we found that Total 
Recall was positively correlated with both CPP- and RU-based updating (rho = .42, p = 
.009; Figure 3D and rho = .45, p = .004; Figure 3E, respectively), while the other two 
variables— Digit Span forward score (rho = .25, p = .14 and rho = .28, p = .09, 
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respectively) and Trail Making B score (rho = .0004, p = .99 and rho = .17, p = .30, 
respectively)— did not reach significance when examined separately for CPP- and RU- 
based updating and independently of other cognitive variables. Participants with better 
memory (Total Recall) made updates that were more sensitive to the model-derived 
normative factors that should govern learning. We note, however, that memory was not 
directly correlated with better performance (i.e., total number of coins caught) in the 
game (rho = .13, p = .45). In contrast to normative learning, cognitive abilities (including 
memory performance) in older adults were not associated with non-normative reward-
based updating (F(9,28) = 1.54, p = .18; Figure 3F). As in Experiment 1, none of the 
personality measures were significantly associated with any of the factors influencing 
belief updating (F(6,31) = 0.58, p = 0.75). 
Similar to what we observed in younger adults in Experiment 1, in Experiment 2, 
older adults’ learning in a dynamic environment was influenced by both normative 
factors, CPP and RU (Nassar et al., 2012), as well as a non-normative factor, outcome 
reward (McGuire et al., 2014). Also as in Experiment 1, the effect of normative factors 
on adaptive learning in older adults was associated with differences in cognitive abilities 
and not with differences in personality. Combined, these two experiments suggest that 
cognitive factors have a stronger influence than personality on individual differences in 
adaptive learning.  
However, the specific cognitive factors that were associated with normative 
learning differed across the two experiments. While in younger adults in Experiment 1 
adaptive learning was linked to IQ (the only cognitive measure collected), in older adults 
in Experiment 2, individual differences in adaptive learning were correlated with memory 
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but not with IQ. One possible explanation is that the different findings in the two 
experiments are due to differences in IQ between the two samples. Even though median 
IQ in the young sample was quite high (Mdn = 117, 87th percentile of the IQ 
distribution), median IQ in the older sample was significantly higher (Mdn = 124.5, 95th 
percentile, Z = 2.61, p = .009). The extremely high level of cognitive ability in our 
sample of older adults is not too surprising, given that highly functioning older adults 
may be more likely to volunteer to participate in research, and that our recruitment 
specifically excluded individuals with cognitive impairments (see Method section), which 
might be common and go undiagnosed in a more representative sample of that age. It is 
possible that the association between IQ and adaptive learning might be obscured by 
restricted range of IQ in our sample of older adults.  
Another possibility is that individual differences in adaptive learning might be 
driven by a specific aspect of cognitive function, which is generally correlated with the 
broader statistical concept of IQ (which would explain the association we observed 
between IQ and adaptive learning in young adults), but is dissociated from IQ in our 
sample of older adults. In fact, memory performance is typically positively correlated 
with IQ (Ackerman et al., 2005), but in our sample of older adults IQ was not 
significantly correlated with recall (rho = .11, p = .53). In addition, memory ability is 
highly relevant to learning in this task. Remembering previous outcomes is essential to 
building and maintaining a mental representation of the task environment and statistics 
(e.g., the current helicopter location, one’s confidence in that estimate, the noise in the 
bag drop distribution), which is necessary for adaptive modulation of learning rates 
according to normative factors. Updating with a fixed learning rate does not require such 
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memory demands. Therefore, it is highly plausible that memory capacity constrains one’s 
ability to perform adaptive inference. It is also possible, however, that this is only true in 
older individuals, where memory abilities start to decline. 
We cannot distinguish between these different possibilities, however, since did 
not collect memory measures in the young adults in Experiment 1. Therefore, we 
conducted a third experiment, with young adults, in an attempt to replicate and 
disentangle the different cognitive influences on adaptive learning. 
 
Experiment 3: Method 
 
While our first two experiments both point to cognitive factors as explaining 
individual differences in adaptive learning, the specific associations we observed in the 
two samples were with different cognitive measures—IQ in younger adults and memory 
(but not IQ) in older adults. In Experiment 3, we aimed to distinguish potential 
explanations for this discrepancy by measuring both IQ and memory in the same sample 
of young adults who performed our adaptive learning task.  
Participants. For Experiment 3 we recruited 40 participants from the University of 
Pennsylvania community (age 18–31, M = 23.2, SD = 3.4; 38% males). Inclusion and 
exclusion criteria were the same as in Experiment 1. Data from one participant were 
excluded from analysis because the participant fell asleep. The effective sample for 
analysis was therefore N = 39.  
Procedure. Participants completed a memory task (described below), the 
similarities and matrix reasoning subtests of the WASI (Wechsler, 1999), and the 
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helicopter task, in that order. Experimenter MP obtained informed consent from the 
participants, and administered the IQ test and the helicopter task. Experimenter YX 
administered the memory task. We used the shorter version of the helicopter task (100 
trials per experimental block), but the training was identical to that used in Experiments 1 
and 2. 
Memory Task. Participants performed a free recall task in a single session 
consisting of eleven word lists in total. The first list was for practice and the ten 
subsequent lists were scored. The procedures were modeled based on previous 
experimental studies of free recall (Polyn, Erlikhman, & Kahana, 2011; Zaromb, et al., 
2006). Each list consisted of 16 words and each word was presented one at a time on a 
computer screen using E-Prime software (Version 2.0, Psychology Software Tools, 
Pittsburgh, PA). All text was presented in white with a black background. At the end of 
each list, participants were asked to name, in any order, as many words as they could 
recall from the just-presented list. The words and their order within lists were identical 
for all participants. All words were drawn randomly without replacement from the 
Toronto Noun Pool (retrieved from 
http://memory.psych.upenn.edu/files/wordpools/nouns.txt). The word pool consists of 
480 words with estimates of word frequency and concreteness. We divided the pool into 
16 groups (obtained by crossing quartiles of frequency and concreteness), and 
constructed each list by drawing a word from each of the 16 groups. At the beginning of 
each list, there was a 1500-ms delay before the first word was shown on the screen. Each 
word then appeared on screen for 3000-ms followed by a jittered interstimulus interval 
(uniformly drawn between 800 and 1200-ms). After the last item in each list, there was a 
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jittered delay period (uniform on 1200-1400-ms) before a 1000-ms tone sounded. The 
tone signaled to the participant the beginning of the recall period. From the tone, 
participants had 75 seconds to attempt to recall any words from the list that was just 
shown. Participants were signaled by a 2000-ms tone at the end of the 75-second period 
to stop recalling. The experimenter recorded participants’ recalled words in order, on a 
pre-prepared answer sheet. 
Statistical Analysis. Data were analyzed as in Experiments 1 and 2. In addition, 
we used the Aroian version of the Sobel’s test (Aroian, 1947; Sobel, 1982) to evaluate the 
mediating effect of normative learning on the relationship between age group and task 
performance. 
 
Experiment 3: Results and Discussion 
 
In this third experiment, we administered the predictive-inference task to a second sample 
of younger adults, and collected measures of both IQ and free recall to investigate the 
differential effects of these two cognitive variables on adaptive learning. 
Similar to Experiments 1 and 2, participants used higher learning rates with 
higher spatial prediction error and lower noise (Figure 4A; median p across prediction 
error bins < .0001) and higher learning rates right after a change point (Figure 4B). Also 
like the previous experiments, model-based analysis revealed a significant positive 
influence of both normative factors, CPP (Mdn = 0.41, Q1 = 0.24, Q3 = 0.57; Z = -5.44, p 
< .0001) and RU (Mdn = 0.31, Q1 = 0.13, Q3 = 0.51; Z = -5.44, p < .0001), and non-
normative factors, PE (Mdn = 0.56, Q1 = 0.42 , Q3 = 0.71; Z = -5.36, p < .0001) and 
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reward (Mdn = 0.05, Q1 = 0.03, Q3 = 0.09; Z = -4.48, p < .0001), on trial-by-trial 
updating (Figure 4C).  
The results of Experiment 3 replicated the pattern observed in Experiment 2, in 
which memory (free recall), but not IQ, predicted normative-based belief updating. A 
model with IQ as the sole independent variable did not significantly predict NLF (Table 
3, F(1,37)= 0.13, p = .72), while a model with only free recall did significantly predict 
NLF (F(1,37) = 5.32, p = .027). A formal comparison showed that adding IQ in addition 
to free recall did not improve prediction of NLF (F(1,36) = 0.42, p = .52). There was a 
small but insignificant direct association between free recall and helicopter task 
performance (rho = .19, p = .25). 
In looking at the effects of memory performance on CPP- and RU-based updating 
separately, we found that both were positively correlated with percent recall (rho = .41, p 
= .01, Figure 4D; and rho = .27, p = .09, Figure 4E, respectively). (Note that while we 
report two-tailed hypothesis tests to be consistent throughout the manuscript, the RU 
effect would reach significance in a one-tailed test, which would be merited given our 
stated attempt to replicate Experiment 2.) Finally, reward-based updating was not 
significantly associated with either IQ (F(1,37) = 0.14, p = .71) or percent recall (F(1,37) 
= 2.32, p = .14; Figure 4F). 
In this second experiment with young participants, we replicated the memory 
effect seen in older participants— free recall performance predicted the degree to which 
participants update beliefs based on normative learning factors. Because we used 
previously collected data from the older sample in Experiment 2, the exact memory 
measures in the two experiments differed, though both are measures of immediate free 
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recall. When we z-scored the immediate memory measures within each sample and 
examined the association across the combined sample (total N = 77), memory 
performance was robustly associated with both CPP- and RU-based belief updating (rho 
= .42, p = .0001 and rho = .35, p = .0019, respectively). 
However, we did not replicate the significant association between IQ and belief 
updating based on normative factors that we observed in the first sample of young adults 
in Experiment 1. If we combine data across the two young samples (total N = 88), the 
association between IQ and CPP-based updating remains statistically significant (rho = 
.22, p = 0.04), while that between IQ and RU-based updating does not (rho = .17, p = 
.11). Furthermore, if we combine across all three samples of (total N =126), IQ is no 
longer significantly associated with either CPP- (rho = .15, p = .09) or RU-based belief 
updating (rho = -.058, p = .52). However, we hesitate to conclude that the correlation 
between IQ and adaptive learning (particularly CPP-based learning) is zero. To have 80% 
power to detect a true correlation of rho = .15, we would need a sample size of 346, and 
to detect a true correlation of rho = .20, we would need a sample size of 194, both of 
which are larger than the samples we collected in any individual experiment or our 
combined sample across all three experiments (calculated with “pwr” R package).  
 
Group differences between young and elderly participants  
 
We hypothesized that age would also be a source of individual differences in adaptive 
learning. To test this, we pooled data from the two samples of younger participants from 
Experiments 1 and 3, as their performance was comparable, and we had no a priori 
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reason to expect differences between the two samples. We then compared this combined 
young sample (N = 88) to the sample of older participants from Experiment 2 (N = 38, 
Figure 5). We looked at the two normative learning factors (CPP and RU effects) 
separately because prior research has shown differential effects of age on these two 
factors (Nassar et al., 2016). Overall, the younger group performed slightly better at the 
task, gathering more coins (M = 29% of total, SD = 2.3) than the older group (M = 27.6%, 
SD = 2.6, t(124) = 3.04, p = .003). There was no significant difference between the 
groups in CPP-based updating (t(124) = 1.07, p = .29). However, younger participants 
were more influenced by the other model-based factor, RU (M = 0.26, SD = .25), than 
older participants (M = 0.14, SD = .27, t(124) = 2.52, p = .013). Younger participants 
were also more influenced by the non-normative reward factor (M = 0.07, SD = .09) than 
older participants (M = 0.03, SD = .07, t(124) = 2.42, p = .017). 
 Given that both task performance and normative learning differ between young 
and elderly participants, we asked whether differences in learning behavior account for 
differences in coins collected between age groups. Age group was a significant predictor 
of the RU effect (b = -0.126, t(124) = -2.52, p = .013), and the RU effect significantly 
predicted coins collected, while controlling for age group (b = 0.032, t(123) = 4.05, p < 
.0001). The effect of age group in predicting coins collected, while significant, decreased 
once the mediating variable (RU effect) was controlled for (b = -0.010, t(123) = -2.25, p 
= .026), compared to a model without the RU effect (b = -0.014, t(124) = -3.04, p = .003). 
The indirect (mediating) effect was significant (Sobel’s Z = -2.09, p = .036), suggesting 
that RU-based updating partially mediates the relationship between age group and task 
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performance. However, reward-based updating, which also differed between age groups, 
was not a significant mediator of that relationship (Sobel’s Z = 1.43, p = .15). 
In this predictive-inference task, the updating behavior of older adults was less 
influenced by uncertainty. This replicates previous findings with a different version of the 
helicopter task (Nassar et al., 2016). Nassar and colleagues used computational modeling 
to show that older adults are specifically impaired in representing and using uncertainty 
to drive learning. As the task used by Nassar and colleagues (2016) included dramatic 
manipulations of uncertainty (the helicopter’s location was occasionally directly 
revealed), our results show that this deficit in uncertainty-based learning extends to 
situations with more subtle fluctuations in uncertainty. Nassar and colleagues (2016) 
further showed that differences between age groups cannot be accounted for by 
differences in fluid intelligence or working memory. Our data are consistent with this 
interpretation, inasmuch as IQ scores were higher in the older adults. Furthermore, in a 
regression model predicting the RU effect (F(3,122) = 3.76, p = .013), age group is close 
to significance (b = 1.08, t(122) = 1.95, p = .054), after controlling for IQ (b = 0.005, 
t(122) = 1.45, p = .15) and its interaction with age group (b = -0.01, t(122) = -2.18, p = 
.031). Unfortunately, we cannot perform a similar test looking at the interaction between 
age and memory because we have different memory measures for the two age groups. 
Nassar et al. (2016) also reported that older adults are more sensitive to CPP than young 
adults, but we did not find such an effect.  
Older participants were also less influenced than young participants by non-
informative rewards. This finding is consistent with previous evidence that healthy aging 
is associated with decreased sensitivity to reward in a probabilistic learning task, which is 
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neurobiologically mediated by reduced white matter integrity in select prefrontal 
pathways (Samanez-Larkin, Levens, Perry, Dougherty, & Knutson, 2012). Interestingly, 
older adults’ diminished sensitivity to reward is present both in contexts where reward is 
informative and advantageous (Samanez-Larkin et al., 2012) and where reward is non-
informative and reward sensitivity might weaken performance. 
 
General Discussion 
 
Across three experiments, we investigated how personality, cognitive abilities and age 
affect individual differences in adaptive learning in volatile environments. We used a 
modified version of a predictive-inference task that allows tracking of trial-by-trial 
learning rates (McGuire et al., 2012; Nassar et al., 2010, 2012, 2016). Consistent with 
several previous reports using this task (McGuire et al., 2014; Nassar et al., 2010, 2012), 
we found that learning rates were influenced by two normative factors related to surprise 
(CPP) and uncertainty (RU), as well as by incidental rewards. As a unique contribution of 
this paper, we found that the degree of reliance on normative learning factors is positively 
associated with cognitive abilities — specifically memory abilities measured with free 
recall — but not with personality. In addition, we found that advanced age was associated 
with a reduced influence of the normative RU factor and a reduced influence of the non-
normative reward factor. Thus, age and cognitive abilities had distinct patterns of overall 
influence on adaptive learning. 
Our finding that better memory abilities are associated with the influence of 
normative learning factors is broadly consistent with a body or work showing that 
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reliance on “model-based” rather than “model-free” reinforcement learning is dependent 
on cognitive resources (Otto, Raio, Chiang, Phelps, & Daw, 2013, Otto et al., 2014). In 
this framework, model-based learning relies on building a sophisticated mental model of 
the environment and evaluating choices in the context of that model, in the same way that 
adaptive inference in the helicopter task requires building an internal model of the 
structure of the environment (incorporating components such as wind, clouds and a 
moving helicopter) and flexibly updating one’s learning rate depending on the 
circumstances.  In contrast, model-free learning relies on the simpler approach of caching 
the value of different actions (Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005). Recent work using this 
reinforcement learning framework has shown that individual differences in cognitive 
abilities, specifically better working memory and cognitive control, predict increased 
model-based vs. model-free contributions to learning (Otto et al., 2013, 2014). In 
addition, high working memory capacity protects individuals against the deleterious 
effect of stress on model-based learning (Otto et al., 2013). 
With our results, two independent studies have now shown that learning in older 
participants is less driven by uncertainty than in young participants. Our previous fMRI 
study has shown that activity in anterior prefrontal regions increases with RU, while 
activity in the medial temporal lobe decreases with RU (McGuire et al., 2014). Both of 
these brain regions show structural and functional impairment in healthy aging (Buckner, 
2004; Fjell et al., 2014; Raz et al., 2005;), which might contribute to a diminished ability 
to compute or use an RU signal. Future work could investigate whether reduced 
uncertainty-driven learning in older adults is associated with changes in prefrontal or 
hippocampal activity, or both.  
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Prior research has hinted at a potential role for affect and arousal in adaptive 
learning. Pupil diameter, which is a measure of arousal, tracks normative factors that 
should influence learning rates, and the extent to which pupil diameter tracks these 
factors across participants predicts learning rates (Nassar et al., 2012). BOLD activity in 
dorsomedial frontal cortex and anterior insula, two regions linked with arousal (Seeley et 
al., 2007), is modulated by factors that influence learning rate, and the extent to which 
activity in these regions is modulated by normative factors predicts the degree of 
behavioral sensitivity to these same factors (McGuire et al., 2014). However, we did not 
find that adaptive learning was associated with any measures of personality, including 
some that should capture differences in affective arousal. This result differs from another 
recent report, which found that anxiety was associated with a reduced effect of volatility 
on learning rates (Browning et al., 2015). As discussed above, this study may have found 
an association as the stimuli being predicted were aversive (and potentially anxiety-
inducing) electric shocks. This difference in findings suggests that the influence of 
personality on adaptive learning may be context-sensitive. More broadly, our results 
suggest that adaptive learning is a result of the interplay between both cognitive and 
affective factors, with cognitive abilities playing a crucial role in constructing mental 
models and expectations, the deviations from which drive arousal and other affective 
responses. Future work is needed to more completely characterize this complex interplay. 
Overall, our findings further extend the aspects of learning and decision-making 
that are affected by age and cognitive abilities. In addition to known and specific benefits 
of better memory, our results highlight how this core psychological process enables 
people to behave more adaptively in a changing world. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Summary of regression results for three models predicting NLF in Experiment 
1. Model 1 includes just one cognitive measure, IQ. Model 2 includes only personality 
measures. Model 3 includes both cognitive and all personality measures of interest.  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable B SE B t(47) B SE B t(41) B SE B t(40) 
I -0.675 0.347 -1.804 0.515 0.520 0.991 -0.526 0.684 -0.768 
IQ 0.008 0.003 2.611*    0.008 0.003 2.208a 
A    0.026 0.061 0.435 0.025 0.058 0.436 
E    -0.070 0.043 -1.633 -0.066 0.041 -1.609 
C    -0.032 0.054 -0.586 -0.020 0.052 -0.383 
N    0.060 0.053 1.130 0.055 0.051 1.089 
O    -0.013 0.056 -0.240 -0.012 0.054 -0.221 
STAI    -0.007 0.005 -1.526 -0.005 0.005 -1.032 
SS    0.065 0.059 1.097 0.066 0.057 1.171 
Model F F(1,47)= 6.82* F(7,41) = 0.78 F(8,40) = 1.36 
 
I = Intercept; A = Agreeableness; E = Extraversion; C = Conscientiousness; N = 
Neuroticism; O = Openness; SS = Sensation Seeking; B = unstandardized regression 
coefficient; SE B = standard error of B; t(dfs) = t-test statistic and degrees of freedom 
*p < 0.013 
a p = 0.033 
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Table 2. Summary of regression results for three models predicting NLF in Experiment 
2. Model 1 includes only cognitive measures. Model 2 includes only personality 
measures. Model 3 includes all cognitive and personality measures of interest.  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable B SE B t(28) B SE B t(31) B SE B t(22) 
I -1.747 1.168 -1.496 0.367 0.402 0.912 -2.433 1.272 -1.913 
IQ -0.002 0.003 -0. 767    -0.000002 0.004 -0.001 
MMSE 0.008 0.032 0.256    -0.008 0.039 -0.201 
DSpanF 0.053 0.021 2.537*    0.082 0.027 3.000b 
DSpanB -0.004 0.017 -0.213    -0.024 0.022 -1.084 
Trails A -0.004 0.005 -0.724    -0.003 0.006 -0.469 
Trails B 0.003 0.001 2.050a    0.004 0.002 2.167c 
Boston N 0.034 0.023 1.445    0.045 0.026 1.704 
T Recall 0.020 0.010 2.053a    0.026 0.011 2.415d 
D Recall 0.005 0.027 0.191    -0.014 0.034 -0.402 
A    0.014 0.079 0.180 0.006 0.076 0.080 
E    -0.067 0.053 -1.254 0.005 0.048 0.110 
C    -0.030 0.067 -0.455 -0.068 0.062 -1.106 
N    -0.045 0.051 -0.935 -0.013 0.044 -0.298 
O    0.052 0.062 0.829 0.120 0.054 2.214c 
SS    0.035 0.061 0.582 0.075 0.058 1.306 
Model F F(9,28)= 3.17* F(6,31) = 0.47 F(15,22) = 2.50d 
 
I = Intercept; MMSE = Mini Mental State Examination score; DSpanF = Digit Span 
Forward score; DSpanB = Digit Span Backwar score; Boston N = Boston Naming score; 
T Recall = Word List Memory Total Recall score; D Recall = Word List Memory 
Delayed Recall score; A = Agreeableness; E = Extraversion; C = Conscientiousness; N = 
Neuroticism; O = Openness; SS = Sensation Seeking; B = unstandardized regression 
coefficient; SE B = standard error of B; t(dfs) = t-test statistic and degrees of freedom; *p 
< 0.017; a p < 0.0498; b p < 0.007; c p < 0.042; d p < 0.025 
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Table 3. Summary of regression results for models predicting NLF in Experiment 3. 
Model 1 only includes Percent Recall. Model 2 only includes IQ. Model 3 includes both 
Percent Recall and IQ. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable B SE B t(37) B SE B t(37) B SE B t(36) 
Intercept -0.017 0.173 -0.096 0.600 0.626 0.957 0.354 0.601 0.589 
RP 0.633 0.274 2.307*    0.653 0.278 2.346* 
IQ    -0.002 0.005 -0.361 -0.003 0.005 -0.645 
Model F F(1,37) = 5.32* F(1,37)= 0.13 F(2,36) = 2.83 
 
PR = percent recall; B = unstandardized regression coefficient; SE B = standard error of 
B; t(dfs) = t-test statistic and degrees of freedom  
*p < 0.027 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Overview of helicopter task and normative learning factors. A. Screenshots of 
helicopter task taken from training and experimental blocks. Participants were asked to position a 
bucket (orange rectangle) right under the helicopter to collect coins. On every trial, the helicopter 
drops bags which explode into coins upon reaching the ground. Once participants position the 
bucket and commit the selection, the bucket turns blue and can no longer be moved until the next 
trial. Bucket shows the gradual accumulation of coins over the course of a block. On every trial, 
participants receive visual feedback about the distance between the bag drop location and the last 
selected bucket position (prediction error, in red). All blocks in the main experiment included 
clouds, which obscured the helicopter from view. B. Fluctuation of normative learning factors in 
a sample experimental block. Change points (black dots) typically result in large prediction 
errors, and change-point probability (in red) is highest on such trials, while relative uncertainly 
(in blue) increases right after a change point and gradually decreases thereafter, as learner 
acquires additional evidence about the new helicopter position.  
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Figure 2. Experiment 1 results: normative learning behavior and its associations with IQ. A. 
Relationship between error magnitude and learning rates, shown separately for low (blue) versus 
high noise/wind (orange) blocks. Learning rates scaled with the magnitude of prediction errors, 
and were higher in the low wind blocks. Average learning rates (circles) were calculated in bins 
of error magnitude in intervals of 10 units centered around the midpoint of each bin, combining 
data from all participants. In both A and B: error bars indicate standard error of the mean; 
significant group differences between low and high noise blocks are indicated by * (p<0.05) or ** 
(p<0.0001). B. Relationship between number of trials after a change point and learning rates, 
shown separately by type of block. Learning rates were highest on trials right after a change point 
and decreased steeply thereafter. Each circle represents average learning rate grouped by number 
of trials after a change point, combining data from all participants. C. Individual differences in 
effects of normative and non-normative factors on updating behavior. Each effect is calculated as 
regression coefficients for respective factor in predicting bucket updates. Each circle represents 
the respective coefficient for one participant; black square represents median coefficient for each 
factor. Circles are jittered for better visibility. Reward effect is the effect of updating based on 
rewarded versus non-rewarded coins. D. Scatterplot of relationship between IQ and CPP effect 
(as represented in C), including best-fit line. Higher IQ was associated with higher CPP-based 
updating. E. Scatterplot of relationship between IQ and RU effect (as represented in C), including 
best-fit line. Higher IQ was associated with higher RU-based updating. F. Scatterplot of 
relationship between IQ and Reward effect (as represented in C), including best-fit line. All 
correlations are Spearman’s rho.  
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Figure 3. Experiment 2 results: normative learning behavior and its associations with 
memory. A. Relationship between error magnitude and learning rates, shown separately for low 
versus high noise/wind blocks. Learning rates scaled with the magnitude of prediction errors, and 
were higher in the low wind blocks. Average learning rates (circles) were calculated in bins of 
error magnitude in intervals of 10 units centered around the midpoint of each bin, combining data 
from all participants. In both A and B: error bars indicate standard error of the mean; significant 
group differences between low and high noise blocks are indicated by * (p<0.05) or ** 
(p<0.0001). B. Relationship between number of trials after a change point and learning rates, 
shown separately by type of block. Learning rates were highest on trials right after a change point 
and decreased steeply thereafter. Each circle represents average learning rate grouped by number 
of trials after a change point, combining data from all participants. C. Individual differences in 
effects of normative and non-normative factors on updating behavior. Each effect is calculated as 
regression coefficients for respective factor in predicting bucket updates. Each circle represents 
the respective coefficient for one participant; black square represents median coefficient for each 
factor. Circles are jittered for better visibility. Reward effect is the effect of updating based on 
rewarded versus non-rewarded coins. D, E, and F. Scatterplots of relationship between memory 
and CPP- , RU-, and Reward effects, respectively, including best-fit lines. All correlations are 
Spearman’s rho.  
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Figure 4. Experiment 3 results: normative learning behavior and its associations with 
memory. A. Relationship between error magnitude and learning rates, shown separately for low 
(blue) versus high noise/wind (orange) blocks. Learning rates scaled with the magnitude of 
prediction errors, and were higher in the low wind blocks. Average learning rates (circles) were 
calculated in bins of error magnitude in intervals of 10 units centered around the midpoint of each 
bin, combining data from all participants. In both A and B: error bars indicate standard error of 
the mean; significant group differences between low and high noise blocks are indicated by * 
(p<0.05) or ** (p<0.0001). B. Relationship between number of trials after a change point and 
learning rates, shown separately by type of block. Learning rates were highest on trials right after 
a change point and decreased steeply thereafter. Each circle represents average learning rate 
grouped by number of trials after a change point, combining data from all participants. C. 
Individual differences in effects of normative and non-normative factors on updating behavior. 
Each effect is calculated as regression coefficients for respective factor in predicting bucket 
updates. Each circle represents the respective coefficient for one participant; black square 
represents median coefficient for each factor. Circles are jittered for better visibility. Reward 
effect is the effect of updating based on rewarded versus non-rewarded coins. D, E, and F. 
Scatterplots of relationship between memory and CPP- , RU-, and Reward effects, respectively, 
including best-fit lines. All correlations are Spearman’s rho. 
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Figure 5. Group differences between young and older participants in updating based on 
normative factors and the incidental reward factor. Older participants update less based on 
RU and coin value. Barplots show average effects for young (dark gray) and old (light gray) and 
error bars show standard error of the mean. Asterisk represents a significant group difference with 
p < 0.02.  
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CHAPTER 3 — Diminished cortical thickness is associated with 
impulsive choice in adolescence 
 
Marieta Pehlivanova, Daniel H. Wolf, Aristeidis Sotiras, Antonia Kaczkurkin, Tyler M. 
Moore, Rastko Ciric, Philip A. Cook, Angel Garcia de La Garza, Adon Rosen, Kosha 
Ruparel, Anup Sharma, Russell T. Shinohara, David R. Roalf, Ruben C. Gur, Christos 
Davatzikos, Raquel E. Gur, Joseph W. Kable, & Theodore D. Satterthwaite 
Abstract 
 
Adolescence is characterized by both maturation of brain structure and increased risk of 
negative outcomes from behaviors associated with impulsive decision-making, such as 
substance abuse and automobile accidents. One important index of impulsive choice is 
delay discounting (DD), which measures the tendency to prefer smaller rewards available 
soon to larger rewards delivered after a delay. However, it remains largely unknown how 
individual differences in structural brain development may be associated with impulsive 
choice during adolescence. Leveraging a unique large sample of 427 youths (208 males 
and 219 females) studied as part of the Philadelphia Neurodevelopmental Cohort, we 
examined associations between delay discounting and cortical thickness within structural 
covariance networks. These structural networks were derived using non-negative matrix 
factorization, an advanced multivariate analysis technique for dimensionality reduction, 
and analyzed using generalized additive models with penalized splines to capture both 
linear and nonlinear developmental effects. We found that impulsive choice was most 
strongly associated with diminished cortical thickness in structural brain networks that 
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encompassed the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, temporal pole, and 
temporal-parietal junction. Furthermore, structural brain networks predicted DD above 
and beyond cognitive performance. Taken together, these results suggest that reduced 
cortical thickness in regions known to be involved in value-based decision-making is a 
marker of impulsive choice during the critical period of adolescence.  
 
Significance 
 
Risky behaviors during adolescence, such as initiation of drug use or reckless driving, are 
a major source of morbidity and mortality. In this study, we present evidence from a large 
sample of youth that diminished cortical thickness in specific structural brain networks is 
associated with impulsive choice. Notably, the strongest association between impulsive 
choice and brain structure was seen in regions implicated in value-based decision-
making, namely the ventromedial prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortex. Moving forward, 
such neuroanatomical markers of impulsivity may aid in the development of personalized 
interventions targeted to reduce risk of negative outcomes during the critical period of 
adolescence.   
 
Introduction  
 
Adolescence is marked by an increased vulnerability to risky behaviors, such as 
tobacco, alcohol, and drug use, reckless driving, and unprotected sex, which can lead to 
increased morbidity and mortality (Eaton et al., 2011). During this vulnerable period, the 
65 
 
brain undergoes dramatic structural changes (Giedd et al., 1999; Sowell et al., 2004). 
Some evidence suggests that risk during adolescence is associated with differential 
maturation of brain regions related to reward processing (such as the orbitofrontal cortex 
and ventral striatum) and those necessary for cognitive control (such as the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, dlPFC; Casey, Jones, & Hare, 2008; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010). One 
of the most commonly used indices of impulsive choice is delay discounting (DD)— a 
behavioral measure of impulsivity where one chooses between a smaller reward delivered 
sooner, and a larger reward with a longer delay (Kable, 2013; Kirby & Maraković, 1995; 
Peters & Büchel, 2011). Delay discounting engages regions known to mature at different 
rates in adolescence, including dlPFC (Peters & Büchel, 2011), orbitofrontal cortex and 
ventral striatum (Bartra, McGuire, & Kable, 2013; Kable & Glimcher, 2007). Increased 
DD has been proposed as a framework for understanding substance abuse and other risky 
decisions as reflecting impulsive choices of immediate reward (Bickel et al., 2007). 
Indeed, studies of adolescents show that higher impulsivity, as indexed by higher 
discounting, is associated with increased smoking frequency (Reynolds, 2004), greater 
alcohol consumption (Field, Christiansen, Cole, & Goudie, 2007), and predicts 
longitudinal increase in both smoking (Audrain-McGovern et al., 2009) and alcohol use 
(Fernie et al., 2013).  
At present, it remains relatively unknown how individual differences in structural 
brain development may relate to DD in adolescents. Neuroanatomical studies in adults 
are more numerous, but have yielded inconsistent results, perhaps due to small samples 
and focused region-of-interest analyses (for a review see Kable & Levy, 2015). For 
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example, it has been reported that greater DD (more impulsive choice) is associated with 
reduced gray matter volume in lateral prefrontal cortex (Bjork, Momenan, & Hommer, 
2009), superior frontal gyrus (Schwartz et al., 2010), and putamen (Cho et al., 2013; 
Dombrovski et al., 2012). Furthermore, greater DD has been associated with larger 
volume of the ventral striatum and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC, Schwartz et al., 
2010), medial prefrontal regions and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC, Cho et al., 2013), 
and prefrontal cortex (Wang et al., 2016). One study of cortical thickness (CT) in adults 
revealed an association between higher DD and decreased CT in both medial prefrontal 
cortex and the ACC (Bernhardt et al., 2014). To our knowledge, there have been no 
neuroanatomical studies in adolescents to specifically examine the relationship between 
DD and cortical thickness. Notably, findings from adults may not necessarily extend to 
adolescents, given the dynamic re-modeling of brain structure that occurs during this 
critical period (Sowell et al., 2004).  
Accordingly, here we investigated how individual differences in DD may be 
associated with differences in brain structure during adolescence. To do this, we 
capitalized upon a large sample of 427 youths imaged as part of the Philadelphia 
Neurodevelopmental Cohort (Satterthwaite et al., 2014a; 2016). We delineated 
covariance networks of cortical thickness using a recently-developed application of non-
negative matrix factorization for the multivariate analysis of high-dimensional 
neuroimaging data (Sotiras, Resnick, & Davatzikos, 2015). Subsequently, we evaluated 
the association between DD and CT in each network while specifically modeling both 
linear and nonlinear developmental effects using penalized splines. We hypothesized that 
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we would find associations between DD and CT in brain regions encoding reward value 
such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC; Bartra et al., 2013; Kable & 
Glimcher, 2007), as well as regions subserving cognitive control (e.g., dlPFC). As 
described below, diminished CT in these as well as other networks was associated with 
impulsive choice, and predicted individual variation in DD above and beyond that 
explained by cognitive performance. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants and sample construction 
 Participants were a subsample of 1,601 youths recruited as part of the 
Philadelphia Neurodevelopmental Cohort (PNC) who underwent neurocognitive 
assessment (Gur et al., 2010; 2012) as well as multimodal neuroimaging (Satterthwaite et 
al., 2014a; 2016). A sub-sample of PNC participants (n = 453) completed the delay 
discounting (DD) task. Of those, n = 2 did not pass the quality control criteria for the task 
(described below). Additionally, n = 24 participants were excluded for the following 
reasons: health conditions that could impact brain structure (n = 19), scanning performed 
more than 12 months from DD testing (n = 1), or inadequate structural image quality (n = 
4). The remaining n = 427 participants constituted our final sample for analysis (mean 
age at scanning: 17.0 ± 3.2 years, age range: 9.3–24.3 years; 48.7%, n = 208 males). 
Delay discounting task 
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 The DD task consisted of 34 self-paced questions where the participant chose 
between a smaller amount of money available immediately or a larger amount available 
after a delay. This task was modeled after the work of Senecal et al. (2012). The smaller, 
immediate rewards ranged between $10 and $34 and were always displayed at the top of 
the computer screen. The larger, delayed rewards were fixed at $25, $30, or $35, with the 
delays ranging between 1 and 171 days. Larger, delayed rewards were always displayed 
on the bottom of the screen. All rewards were hypothetical but participants were 
instructed to make decisions as if the choices were real. Discount rates based on 
hypothetical choices have shown no systematic differences from discount rates based on 
real rewards, in the same subjects (Johnson & Bickel, 2002). The set of choices was 
identical in content and order for all participants. The DD task was administered as part 
of an hour-long web-based battery of neurocognitive tests (Computerized Neurocognitive 
Battery, described below), on a separate day from the imaging session. The mean interval 
between the DD task and imaging was 0.44 months with a SD of 1 month (range 0–8 
months). 
 Discount rates from the delay discounting task were calculated assuming a 
hyperbolic discounting model of the form: SV = A/(1+kD), where SV is the subjective 
value of the delayed reward, A is amount of the delayed reward, D is the delay in days, 
and k is the subject-specific discount rate (Mazur, 1987). We used the fmincon 
optimization algorithm in MATLAB (Mathworks, Natick, MA) to estimate the best-
fitting k from each participant’s choice data. A higher k value indicates steeper 
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discounting of delayed rewards and thus more impulsive choices. As the distribution of 
discount rates is highly right-skewed, we used log-transformed k (log k) in all analyses. 
 We performed quality control to ensure that participants were not responding 
randomly, and verified that their responses were a function of task variables which should 
be relevant to the choice. Although a hyperbolic discounting model has been shown to fit 
discounting data better than an exponential model (Kirby & Maraković, 1995), quality 
control was performed independently of assumptions about the shape of the discount 
function. Specifically, each participant’s responses were fit with a logistic regression 
model, with predictors including the immediate amount, delayed amount, delay, their 
respective squared terms, and two-way interaction terms. We assessed goodness of fit of 
this model using the coefficient of discrimination (Tjur, 2009), and discarded DD data 
from any participant who had a value of less than 0.20.  
Neurocognitive battery  
 Cognition was assessed using the University of Pennsylvania Computerized 
Neurocognitive Battery (Penn CNB, Gur et al., 2010; 2012) during the same session that 
delay discounting was evaluated. Briefly, this hour-long battery consisted of 14 tests 
administered in a fixed order, evaluating various aspects of cognition, including 
executive control, episodic memory, complex reasoning, social cognition, and 
sensorimotor and motor speed. Except for the motor tests that only measure speed, each 
test provides measures of both accuracy and speed. Performance on the tests for each 
domain is summarized as cognitive factors obtained with exploratory factor analysis with 
an oblique rotation (Moore, Reise, Gur, Hakonarson, & Gur, 2015). Prior work has 
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demonstrated that accuracy on this battery can be parsimoniously summarized as either 
one overall cognitive performance factor or three domain-specific factors, including 
executive function and complex reasoning combined, social cognition, and episodic 
memory (Moore et al., 2015). Associations between DD and factor scores for each of 
these dimensions were analyzed, as described below.  
Image acquisition and quality assurance  
 Image acquisition and processing are reported in detail elsewhere (Satterthwaite et 
al., 2014a; 2016). Briefly, all data were acquired on a single scanner (Siemens TIM Trio 
3 Tesla, Erlangen, Germany; 32-channel head coil) using the same imaging sequences. 
Structural brain scanning was completed using a magnetization‐prepared, rapid 
acquisition gradient‐echo (MPRAGE) T1‐weighted image with the following 
parameters: TR 1810 ms; TE 3.51 ms; FOV 180x240 mm; matrix 192x256; 160 slices; 
slice thickness/gap 1/0 mm; TI 1100 ms; flip angle 9 degrees; effective voxel resolution 
of 0.93 x 0.93 x 1.00 mm; total acquisition time 3:28 min. T1 image quality was 
independently assessed by three expert image analysts, who were trained to >85% 
concordance with faculty consensus rating on an independent dataset; images with 
substantial artifact were excluded from analysis. 
Image processing and cortical thickness estimation 
Structural image processing for estimating cortical thickness (CT) used tools 
included in Advanced Normalization Tools (ANTs, Tustison et al., 2014). In order to 
avoid registration bias and maximize sensitivity to detect regional effects that can be 
impacted by registration error, a custom adolescent template and tissue priors were 
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created. Structural images were then processed and registered to this template using the 
ANTs CT pipeline (Tustison et al., 2014). This procedure includes brain extraction, N4 
bias field correction (Tustison et al., 2010), Atropos probabilistic tissue segmentation 
(Avants et al., 2011b), the top-performing SyN diffeomorphic registration method (Klein 
et al., 2010; Avants et al., 2011a), and direct estimation of cortical thickness in 
volumetric space (Das, Avants, Grossman, & Gee, 2009). Large-scale evaluation studies 
have shown that this highly accurate procedure for estimating CT is more sensitive to 
individual differences over the lifespan than comparable techniques (Tustison et al., 
2014). CT images were down-sampled to 2 mm voxels before applying non-negative 
matrix factorization, but no additional smoothing was performed. 
Non-negative matrix factorization  
Cortical thickness was estimated as described above over the entire cortical 
surface. We sought to reduce CT in our sample into fewer dimensions, for two reasons. 
First, an efficient summary of CT data would allow us to evaluate only a small number of 
associations, rather than conduct voxel-wise inference that may be vulnerable to 
substantial Type I error (Eklund, Nichols, & Knutsson, 2016). Second, and importantly, 
prior work has shown that there are inherent patterns of covariance in CT (Alexander-
Bloch, Giedd, & Bullmore, 2013; Sotiras et al., 2015, 2017; Zielinski, Gennatas, Zhou, & 
Seeley, 2010), and analyzing the data according to this covariance structure may enhance 
interpretability. 
 Accordingly, we achieved both goals by using non-negative matrix factorization 
(NMF) to identify structural networks where cortical thickness co-varies consistently 
72 
 
across individuals and brain regions (Sotiras et al., 2015). NMF has previously been 
shown to yield more interpretable and reproducible components than other decomposition 
techniques such as Principal Component Analysis or Independent Component Analysis 
(Sotiras et al., 2015, 2017). In contrast to the other techniques, NMF only yields compact 
networks with positive weights, which facilitates interpretation of effects.  
The NMF algorithm takes as input a matrix X containing voxel-wise CT estimates 
(dimensions: 128,155 voxels x 427 participants), and approximates that matrix as a 
product of two matrices with non-negative elements: X  BC (Figure 1). The first matrix, 
B, is of size V x K and contains the estimated non-negative networks and their respective 
loadings on each of the V voxels, where K is the user-specified number of networks. The 
B matrix (“CT loadings”) is composed of coefficients that denote the relative contribution 
of each voxel to a given network. These non-negative coefficients of the decomposition 
by necessity represent the entirety of the brain as a subject-specific addition of various 
parts. The second matrix, C, is of size K x N and contains subject-specific scores for each 
network. These subject-specific scores (“CT network scores”) indicate the contribution of 
each network in reconstructing the original CT map for each individual, and were 
evaluated for associations with DD as described below. We examined multiple NMF 
solutions requesting 2 to 30 networks (in steps of 2) and calculated reconstruction error 
for each solution as the Frobenius norm between the CT data matrix and its NMF 
approximation (Sotiras et al., 2015, 2017). The optimal number of components was 
chosen based on the elbow of the gradient of the reconstruction error, such that the 
solution is adequate to model the structure of the data without modeling random noise 
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(Sotiras et al., 2017). Network loadings were visualized on the inflated Population-
Average, Landmark-, and Surface-based (PALS) cortical surfaces (Van Essen, 2005) 
using Caret software (Van Essen et al., 2001).  
Experimental design and statistical analyses  
 To examine associations between DD and brain structure, we used a cross-
sectional sample of youths recruited as part of a large neurodevelopmental study. As 
described above, our analysis sample consisted of 427 young participants who had usable 
data from both the DD task and structural neuroimaging. 
 Brain development is frequently a nonlinear process (Giedd et al., 1999; Lenroot 
et al., 2007; Satterthwaite et al., 2014b). In order to capture both linear and nonlinear age 
effects, we modeled age with a penalized spline within Generalized Additive Models 
(GAMs; Wood, 2004; 2011; Vandekar et al., 2015). In this type of model, a penalty is 
assessed on nonlinearity using restricted maximum likelihood in order to avoid 
overfitting. GAMs were implemented in the R package ‘mgcv’ (https://cran.r-
project.org/web/packages/mgcv/index.html).  
 GAMs were first used to test for associations between DD and demographic 
variables such as age and sex. Next, we evaluated the association between DD and 
cognitive performance (as summarized by the overall cognitive performance factor and 
three domain-specific factor scores described above), while co-varying for sex and age. 
In both sets of analyses, DD was used as the dependent variable. Finally, univariate 
associations between DD and NMF-derived structural covariance networks were 
evaluated, with CT scores as the dependent variables and controlling for sex and age. 
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Interactions between DD and age were evaluated but were not found to be significant, 
and were thus not included in the univariate models. To control multiple testing across 
either cognitive factors or structural covariance networks, we used the False Discovery 
Rate (FDR, Q<0.05; Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). 
 In order to ensure that our results were not driven by potentially confounding 
factors, we conducted several sensitivity analyses. First, to ensure that our results were 
not driven by socio-economic status (SES) or non-specific neurostructural effects, we 
repeated these analyses while including maternal education and total brain volume as 
model covariates in separate models. Second, we repeated our analyses while excluding 
participants who were taking a psychotropic medication at the time of scan (n = 52) or for 
whom medication data was not available (n = 3) to ensure that these participants did not 
bias the observed results.   
Multivariate analyses 
The analyses described above examined univariate associations between each 
structural covariance network and DD. As a final step, we also investigated the 
multivariate predictive power of all cortical networks considered simultaneously, over 
and above that of a reduced model that included only demographics and cognitive data.  
The full model predicted DD using all 19 NMF networks, as well as age, sex, and the 
cognitive factors that were significantly associated with DD. This full model was 
compared to the reduced model (without the CT networks) using an F-test. 
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Results  
 
Impulsive choice is associated with reduced cognitive performance 
Mean discount rate in our sample was 0.073 ± 0.088. Delay discounting was not 
related to demographic variables including age (p = .387). There was a non-significant 
trend toward more impulsive discounting in males (p = .07), and this trend was most 
prominent at younger ages (age by sex interaction: p = .09). In contrast, delay discounting 
was significantly associated with cognitive performance: youth who had higher discount 
rates also tended to have lower overall cognitive performance (partial r = -.26, p < .0001). 
Follow-up analyses with a three-factor model describing specific cognitive domains 
revealed that this effect was driven primarily by an association with a combined 
executive functioning and complex reasoning factor (partial r = -.29, p < .0001). Greater 
discounting was also associated with diminished memory accuracy (partial r = -.20, p < 
.0001), whereas there was no significant relationship between DD and social cognition 
(partial r = -.08, p = .10).  
Non-negative matrix factorization identifies structural covariance networks 
Next, we sought to identify structural covariance networks in CT using NMF. 
NMF provides a data-driven way to identify structural covariance networks, where 
cortical thickness varies in a consistent way across individuals. As NMF identifies 
structural networks at a resolution set by the user, we examined solutions ranging from 2 
to 30 networks (in steps of 2). As expected, reconstruction error consistently decreased as 
the number of networks increased. Similar to previous applications of this method 
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(Sotiras et al., 2015), reconstruction error stabilized at 20 networks (Figure 2). 
Accordingly, the 20-network solution was used for all subsequent analyses (Figure 3). 
As in prior work using NMF (Sotiras et al., 2017), the structural covariance 
networks identified were highly symmetric bilaterally. Networks included specific 
cortical regions that are relevant to decision-making, such as ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (vmPFC) and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). Notably, when combined, several of the 
networks corresponded to aspects of functional brain networks. For example, networks 1 
and 3 loaded on ACC and anterior insula, respectively, similar to the “salience network” 
(Seeley et al., 2007). Furthermore, specific networks defined lower-order systems, 
including motor (network 11) and visual (network 12) cortex. The 20-network solution 
also included a noise component (network 17), which was subsequently excluded from 
all analyses, resulting in 19 networks evaluated in total. 
Greater delay discounting is associated with diminished cortical thickness  
Having identified 19 interpretable structural covariance networks using NMF, we 
next examined associations with delay discounting while controlling for sex as well as 
linear and nonlinear age effects using penalized splines. Univariate analyses revealed that 
there was a significant association (after FDR correction) in eleven networks (Table 1). In 
each of these networks, impulsive choice, indicated by high discount rates, was 
associated with diminished cortical thickness. Notably, the strongest effects were found 
in two networks including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and orbitofrontal cortex, 
both regions known to be critical for reward-related decision-making. These two 
networks also included parts of the temporal pole and temporoparietal junction, TPJ 
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(networks 14 and 15; Figure 4). Other networks where DD was associated with reduced 
CT included the temporal poles (network 9), lateral (network 8) and posterior temporal 
lobe (network 20), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (network 18), insula (network 3), 
fusiform gyrus (network 7), fronto-parietal cortex (network 11), and visual cortex 
(network 12).  
Association between cortical thickness and delay discounting is independent of age-
related changes in cortical thickness 
 Having established that individual differences in DD are associated with CT, we 
next examined whether this effect was moderated by age. Notably, there was no 
significant age by DD interaction on any network (median p  = .77, range: .09—.94). 
Thus, age-related changes in CT were similar in both high and low discounters, but those 
with a higher discount rate had thinner cortex across the age range examined (Figure 5). 
Sensitivity analyses provide convergent results 
We conducted sensitivity analysis to evaluate potentially confounding variables 
including maternal education, total brain volume, and psychotropic medications. First, we 
examined if results could be explained by differences in maternal education, a proxy of 
socioeconomic status. Discount rate was significantly associated with maternal education 
(partial r = -.164, p = .0007), but including it in the model did not have a great impact on 
results. Specifically, 7 of 11 networks found to be related to DD remained FDR-
significant, including the vmPFC and OFC networks; the other 4 networks trended 
towards significance (pfdr < .067). Second, we examined the effect of total brain volume 
on our findings. After adding total brain volume as a covariate, 10 of 11 networks 
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remained FDR-significant for association with DD, with the remaining network showing 
a trend towards FDR-significance (pfdr = .0762). Finally, we repeated this analysis after 
excluding 52 participants who were taking psychotropic medication at the time of scan 
and 3 participants for whom medication data were missing. Despite the reduced power of 
this smaller sample, 10 of 11 networks remained FDR-significant, with the final network 
showing a trend trend towards significance (pfdr  = .0503).   
Covariance networks provide improved prediction of DD over demographic and 
cognitive data 
The univariate analyses described above demonstrated that reduced CT in several 
structural covariance networks is associated with impulsive choice. Next, we tested 
whether a multivariate model including all structural networks could accurately predict 
DD on an individual basis. Delay discounting predicted from a model of CT scores in all 
19 networks, as well demographic data (age and sex), was significantly correlated with 
actual delay discounting behavior (r = .33, p < .0001; Figure 6). Adding CT scores to a 
reduced model with demographics alone improved model fit (F(405,424) = 2.37, p = .001); 
DD predicted from this reduced model with demographics only achieved a correlation of 
.097 (p = .043) with actual log k values.  
Importantly, CT data also improved prediction above and beyond that achieved by 
cognitive predictors: adding CT scores to a model with cognitive performance as well as 
demographics improved the model fit (F(403,422) = 1.63, p = .047). DD predicted from the 
reduced model with just demographics and cognition achieved a correlation of .31 (p < 
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.0001) between model-predicted and actual log k values, compared to a correlation of .40 
(p < .0001) from the full model including CT data, cognitive data, and demographics. 
 
Discussion 
 
We examined associations between delay discounting and cortical thickness 
networks in a large adolescent sample. More impulsive preferences, as indexed by higher 
discounting, were associated with diminished CT in multiple networks. The strongest 
effects were found in OFC, vmPFC, temporal pole, and the TPJ. Associations between 
DD and brain structure did not vary over the age range studied, and could not be 
explained by confounding variables. Furthermore, consideration of structural networks 
improved prediction of DD above and beyond demographic and cognitive variables. 
Structural covariance networks related to DD overlap with known functional networks  
Greater discounting was associated with decreased cortical thickness in multiple 
structural networks. Relative to previous reports of both neurofunctional and 
neurostructural correlates of delay discounting (Bernhardt et al., 2014; Kable & Levy, 
2015; Peters & Büchel, 2011), the effects we observed were fairly widespread across the 
brain. Notably, many of the regions encompassed by these networks correspond to 
findings from previous studies in adults, including functional networks known to be 
involved in DD. As hypothesized, we found associations between DD and CT in central 
elements of the valuation network, namely vmPFC (Bartra et al., 2013); the cognitive 
control network, including dlPFC (Peters & Büchel, 2011; Stanger et al., 2013); and the 
prospection network, involving the medial temporal cortex (Peters & Büchel, 2011). 
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While DD and CT relationships have not previously been evaluated in adolescents, one 
prior study documented diminished thickness in the ACC and medial PFC in association 
with greater DD in adults (Bernhardt et al., 2014). In addition to hypothesized effects, we 
also found associations between DD and CT in motor, somatosensory, and both early and 
higher-order visual cortices. Notably, when these effects were evaluated jointly in 
multivariate model, CT networks enhanced prediction of DD above and beyond 
demographic and cognitive variables. This result contributes to efforts in neuroeconomics 
to improve prediction of decision-making behavior using brain-based measures obtained 
independently of the behavior itself (Kable & Levy, 2015), and suggests that structural 
covariance networks may be a useful marker of impulsive choice in youth. 
Results converge with data from lesion and neuromodulation studies 
Although the negative associations between DD and CT were widespread and 
distributed, two structural covariance networks exhibited particularly strong associations 
with DD and robustness to all sensitivity analyses. Brain regions comprising these 
networks included vmPFC, OFC, temporal pole, and the TPJ. As mentioned above, our 
findings in vmPFC were expected based on substantial evidence from fMRI studies that 
this brain region is implicated in DD (Ballard & Knutson, 2009; Bartra et al., 2013; Kable 
& Glimcher, 2007). Furthermore, activity in vmPFC when merely thinking about the 
future predicts DD, such that lower discounters show greater activity when thinking 
about the far future (Cooper, Kable, Kim, & Zauberman, 2013). Finally, consistent with 
our results, a previous study in adults reported that diminished CT in that region was 
associated with higher DD (Bernhardt et al., 2014). 
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 Beyond the vmPFC, there is evidence that regions including the OFC, temporal 
pole, and TPJ are both involved in and necessary for evaluating future outcomes in delay 
discounting. First, patients with medial OFC damage show greater discounting of both 
primary and secondary rewards, compared to healthy controls and non-frontal damage 
patients (Sellitto, Ciaramelli, & di Pellegrino, 2010), and this is the only region where 
lesions have been reported to increase discounting in humans. Notably, this relationship 
is dose-dependent, such that larger frontal lesions are associated with steeper discounting. 
Second, patients with semantic dementia, a disorder characterized by anterior temporal 
lobe atrophy, show greater discounting than controls (Chiong et al., 2015). Third, while 
the TPJ has typically been implicated in social cognition and theory of mind, recent data 
suggests it plays a role in both monetary and social discounting (Soutschek, Ruff, 
Strombach, Kalenscher, & Tobler, 2016; Strombach et al., 2015). Importantly, disrupting 
the TPJ in healthy adults using transcranial magnetic stimulation increased discounting 
(Soutschek et al., 2016). Collectively, this evidence suggests that the disruption of OFC, 
anterior temporal lobe, and TPJ may promote impulsive choice.   
Associations with delay discounting are independent of age-related changes 
While we replicated prior findings of association between lower discounting and 
higher IQ (Shamosh & Gray, 2008) and memory performance (Shamosh et al., 2008), we 
did not find significant associations between DD and age (Scheres et al., 2006; Steinberg 
et al., 2009). This may be due to differences in sample composition, including an older 
range being sampled and a dimensional rather than a stratified design that compared older 
and younger age groups. Notably, the association between brain structure and DD was 
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stable across the entire age range surveyed in our sample. This result is consistent with a 
prior study of DD in adolescents and white matter integrity assessed using diffusion 
imaging (Olson et al., 2009). Together, these results imply that individual differences in 
brain structure associated with impulsive choice do not emerge specifically during 
adolescence. These results may also suggest that such individual differences in brain 
structure may emerge early in development, consistent with literature describing the 
importance of structural brain development in utero, during the peri-natal period, and 
during early childhood (Di Martino et al., 2014; Thomason et al., 2013). While 
speculative, future research may reveal that individual differences in brain structure 
which emerge early in life may impact evolving patterns of value and cognitive control 
system function in adolescence which, in turn, may contribute to impulsivity during this 
critical period (Bjork, Smith, Chen, & Hommer, 2010; Casey et al., 2008).   
Advantages of evaluating structural covariance networks in a large sample 
The greater spatial extent of significant associations between brain structure and 
DD observed in our data compared to prior results may be due to several aspects of our 
study. First, the large sample size afforded greater statistical power, and thus greater 
sensitivity to detect effects in multiple brain networks. While the effect sizes of these 
associations were small, research documenting inflation of effect sizes in small studies 
suggests that the present results are more likely to be an accurate reflection of the true 
effect size than data from more modest samples (Button et al., 2013). Second, structural 
covariance networks defined by NMF provided a parsimonious summary of the high-
dimensional imaging data that limited multiple comparisons. In contrast to anatomic 
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atlases based on sulcal folding patterns, NMF identifies structural brain networks based 
on patterns of covariance in the data itself. The concise summary of the data yielded by 
NMF limited multiple comparisons: we only evaluated 19 networks in our analyses, in 
contrast to the hundreds of thousands of voxels typically surveyed in mass-univariate 
VBM studies. This allowed us to use a rigorous FDR correction for all comparisons, 
rather than cluster-based inference that may produce substantial Type I error rates in 
many common implementations (Eklund et al., 2016).  
Limitations 
Certain limitations of this study should be noted. First, the observed effects were 
independent of age, suggesting that differences in brain structure associated with 
impulsive choice may emerge earlier than the examined age range. Future investigations 
should consider longitudinal designs including early childhood to precisely capture the 
emergence of these effects.  Second, we were unable to directly test the associations with 
risky behaviors, such as tobacco, drug use and risky sexual behaviors. Subsequent work 
would benefit from the inclusion of such outcome measures and a direct evaluation of 
which specific DD-related networks predict increased risk-taking in adolescence. Third, 
we used hypothetical instead of real rewards in the DD task. However, prior studies have 
yielded similar results between real and hypothetical reward tasks in both behavioral 
(Johnson & Bickel, 2002) and functional neuroimaging paradigms (Bickel, Pitcock, Yi, 
& Angtuaco, 2009). Fourth, we cannot completely rule out potential confounding 
variables which may be correlated with DD. Previous studies have described associations 
between CT and SES in adolescence (Mackey et al., 2015), though importantly our 
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results remained largely unaffected after controlling for maternal education, a proxy of 
SES.     
Conclusions and future directions 
Understanding impulsive choice in adolescence is important because impulsivity 
is associated with a host of risky behaviors and outcomes, such as tobacco use (Audrain-
McGovern et al., 2009; Reynolds, 2004), alcohol use (Fernie et al., 2013; Field et al., 
2007), obesity (Fields, Sabet, & Reynolds, 2013) and early sexual initiation (Khurana et 
al., 2012), which lead to substantial morbidity and mortality during adolescence. 
Leveraging a large developmental sample and advanced analytics, we found that 
individual variability in brain structure explains differences in DD in adolescence. Taken 
together, our results indicate that higher DD in youth is associated with reduced cortical 
thickness in multiple networks, including those known to be essential for valuation. 
These results emphasize that risky behaviors in adolescents should be considered in the 
context of individual differences of structural brain networks that are present early in life. 
Moving forward, such brain-based measures could potentially be used as biomarkers to 
identify youth at particularly high risk for negative outcomes, and aid in stratifying youth 
within targeted clinical trials that aim to reduce impulsivity and risk-taking behaviors 
during this critical period.  
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Tables 
Table 1. Association between delay discounting and NMF-derived structural 
covariance networks. β (unstandardized regression coefficient), SE (β’s standard error), 
t (t-value for testing β against 0, dfs = 423), p-value, and FDR-corrected p-value are 
obtained from separate general additive models run for each network. In this model, 
discount rate (log k) predicts cortical thickness scores, controlling for age (fit as a 
penalized spline) and sex. In order to provide an estimate of the effect size, r is the partial 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient between discount rate and CT scores in each network, 
while adjusting for linear age, quadratic age, and sex. FDR-significant p-values are 
indicated in bold.  
 
Network ß SE t p FDR-p r 
Ntwk 1 -0.649 0.3946 -1.64 0.101 0.137 -0.080 
Ntwk 2 -0.0138 0.4217 -0.03 0.974 0.974 0.002 
Ntwk 3 -1.5868 0.5606 -2.83 0.005 0.019 -0.136 
Ntwk 4 -0.4337 0.6414 -0.68 0.499 0.527 -0.033 
Ntwk 5 -0.9959 0.4811 -2.07 0.039 0.062 -0.100 
Ntwk 6 -0.8277 0.5337 -1.55 0.122 0.154 -0.075 
Ntwk 7 -1.1428 0.4359 -2.62 0.009 0.024 -0.126 
Ntwk 8 -1.1598 0.4562 -2.54 0.011 0.024 -0.123 
Ntwk 9 -0.7926 0.3580 -2.21 0.027 0.047 -0.110 
Ntwk 10 -0.3748 0.3055 -1.23 0.221 0.262 -0.060 
Ntwk 11 -1.1527 0.4669 -2.47 0.014 0.027 -0.119 
Ntwk 12 -1.5839 0.6164 -2.57 0.011 0.024 -0.124 
Ntwk 13 -1.173 0.4283 -2.74 0.006 0.02 -0.132 
Ntwk 14 -2.019 0.4241 -4.76 <0.0001 <0.0001 -0.225 
Ntwk 15 -1.257 0.3036 -4.14 <0.0001 <0.0001 -0.200 
Ntwk 16 -0.4404 0.4371 -1.01 0.314 0.351 -0.050 
Ntwk 18 -1.252 0.4305 -2.91 0.004 0.018 -0.140 
Ntwk 19 -0.7172 0.3713 -1.93 0.054 0.079 -0.094 
Ntwk 20 -0.8778 0.3014 -2.91 0.004 0.018 -0.140 
!
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Schematic of non-negative matrix factorization and example data for each 
matrix. X is the original matrix with a sample of actual cortical thickness data; Sample 
CT map shows example CT data from one participant, and corresponds to a column in the 
X matrix; B is matrix with a sample of actual estimated networks and their loadings on 
each voxel; Loadings map shows example loadings from one network in NMF solution 
used in our analyses, and corresponds to a column in the B matrix; C is a matrix with 
actual subject-specific weights for each network; Histogram shows CT Scores in same 
sample network as visualized in B, and corresponds to a row in the C matrix. Matrix sizes 
are shown with following dimensions: V = number of cortical thickness voxels, N = 
number of participants; K = number of networks.  
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Figure 2. NMF reconstruction error identifies 20 cortical networks as the optimal 
parcellation resolution for cortical thickness data. Plot of reconstruction error gradient 
for NMF at multiple resolutions; the gradient is the difference in reconstruction error as 
the NMF solution increases by 2 networks. Blue circle indicates selected NMF solution 
of 20 networks.  
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Figure 3. Structural covariance networks delineated by NMF. Visualization of 
structural covariance networks from the 20-network NMF solution. The spatial 
distribution of each network is indicated by loadings at each voxel in arbitrary units (from 
B matrix in NMF factorization); warmer colors represent higher loadings. For each 
network, we show one view that best captures the main area(s) of coverage. Approximate 
anatomical coverage of each structural covariance network: 1) medial prefrontal cortex 
and cingulate cortex; 2) medial temporal lobe; 3) insula; 4) medial posterior parietal 
cortex, including the precuneus; 5) temporo-occipital cortex; 6) dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (dlPFC); 7) fusiform gyrus; 8) lateral temporal lobe; 9) lateral temporal lobe and 
temporal pole; 10) posterior cingulate cortex and temporal lobe; 11) frontal and parietal 
cortex, including primary motor and somatosensory cortices; 12) occipital cortex; 13) 
medial temporal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and posterior cingulate cortex 
(PCC); 14) orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), frontal and temporal poles; 15) ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), inferior temporal lobe, auditory cortex, temporoparietal 
junction (TPJ); 16) dorsal OFC; 17) the dura matter, a noise component that was not 
evaluated further; 18) dlPFC; 19) angular and supramarginal gyri; 20) posterior inferior 
temporal lobe.  
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Figure 4. Higher discounting is associated with diminished cortical thickness in 
frontal, temporal, and parietal areas. Regions of FDR-significant association between 
log k and structural covariance networks. The composite network visualization was 
obtained by assigning each voxel to the network which had the highest loading for that 
voxel (from the B matrix), across all 19 networks. Maximal effects were observed in 
Networks 14 and 15, which included orbitorfrontal cortex and ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex. Scatterplots for log k-CT association in these networks are shown, while adjusting 
for model covariates. Gray envelope represents the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure 5. Association between cortical thickness and delay discounting is 
independent of age. Scatterplots for relationship between age and CT in networks 14 and 
15, separated by top (Q4) and bottom (Q1) quartiles of log k. The Q4 quartile group 
contains participants with the most impulsive preferences. For each quartile, the age-CT 
relationship is shown after adjusting for model covariates, and includes the 95% 
confidence intervals (gray envelopes).   
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Figure 6. CT data from structural covariance networks predicts delay discounting. 
Scatterplot for relationship between actual log k values and predicted log k from 
multivariate CT prediction. Multivariate prediction is based on CT scores from all 
structural covariance networks plus demographic variables, sex, and age. Scatterplots 
include line of best fit for this association with a 95% confidence interval (gray 
envelope). 
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CHAPTER 4 — General discussion 
 
Overall summary 
The research presented in this dissertation furthers our understanding of 
individual differences in two types of decision-making: adaptive learning (Chapter 2) and 
delay discounting (Chapter 3). Results presented in Chapter 2 showed that individuals 
across the lifespan exhibit large variability in using normative learning strategies in a 
dynamic environment, and these differences relate to cognitive, but not personality, 
factors. Specifically, better memory performance was associated with more “adaptive” 
learning, in both young (age 18-35, Experiment 3) and elderly (age 60+, Experiment 2) 
participants. In addition, adaptive learning in elderly adults was less influenced by 
uncertainty, but also less influenced by a non-normative reward factor. Reliance on 
normative learning factors has previously been associated with neural activity in the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC), and medial 
temporal lobe, among other regions (McGuire, Nassar, Gold, & Kable, 2014). Next, we 
directly investigated the neural bases of delay discounting and found structural effects in 
some of these regions. Results presented in Chapter 3 showed that cortical thickness 
across multiple networks of brain regions was associated with individual differences in 
delay discounting in a large sample of adolescents. Specifically, diminished cortical 
thickness in frontal and temporal regions was associated with higher discounting, i.e., 
more impulsive choices. The strongest effects were found in regions typically implicated 
in delay discounting, such as the vmPFC and orbitofrontal cortex. Furthermore, cortical 
thickness data predicted differences in delay discounting above and beyond cognitive 
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variables typically found to correlate with delay discounting. Broader implications and 
future directions of this research are discussed below.  
Influences of cognitive factors and arousal on adaptive learning 
In Chapter 2, across three experiments, adaptive learning behavior, and 
specifically the degree of reliance on normative learning factors, was positively 
associated with cognitive abilities— memory and IQ— but not personality. Notably, 
there were no clear links between learning and personality traits related to affective 
arousal, e.g., anxiety and neuroticism, even though arousal has been shown to play a role 
in adaptive learning. Prior work with a simpler version of the predictive-inference task 
reported that arousal sensitivity to task statistics, as measured by pupillary responses, 
reflects behavioral sensitivity to normative learning factors (Nassar et al., 2012). 
Specifically, the degree to which pupil diameter tracks normative learning factors 
predicts learning rates across participants. Pupil dilation is considered a marker of 
affective arousal (Bradley, Miccoli, Escrig, & Lang, 2008; Partala & Surakka, 2003), and 
its response to emotionally arousing stimuli can be modulated by anxiety (Bertrand, 
Garcia, Viera, Santos, & Bertrand, 2013) and neuroticism (Prehn et al., 2008). However, 
in addition to being an indicator of affective arousal states, pupil diameter has also been 
linked to both state and trait cognitive characteristics. For example, pupil diameter tracks 
the amount of material being processed in memory (Kahneman & Beatty, 1966), and 
baseline pupil diameter is positively correlated with working memory capacity across 
individuals (Heitz, Schrock, Payne, & Engle, 2008). Furthermore, pupil dilation while 
performing cognitive tasks is associated with intelligence (Ahern & Beatty, 1979; Van 
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Der Meer et al., 2010), such that higher intelligence contributes to more efficient 
cognitive processing or better access to cognitive resources. Given pupil diameter’s 
associations with cognitive abilities and processing, the link between our findings and 
previous findings of pupil-linked arousal’s influence on adaptive learning (Nassar et al., 
2012) is intriguing. Is the role of arousal in adaptive learning reflective of cognitive or 
affective influences on normative learning? Future work is needed to characterize the 
interplay of cognitive abilities and arousal in this task. Specifically, it would be 
interesting to measure cognitive abilities (memory and intelligence) and arousal in the 
same setting, and test whether cognitive abilities modulate arousal in response to 
environmental statistics. This work could also be replicated and extended by using 
alternative measures of arousal, such as galvanic skin response and heart rate variability.  
The role of memory in value-based decision-making 
The data presented in this dissertation point to memory as an important source of 
individual differences in decision-making. In the adaptive learning framework (Chapter 
2), better memory performance, across different age groups and different memory tasks, 
was associated with higher reliance on normative learning factors. In the study of 
adolescent delay discounting (Chapter 3), we replicated a prior association with memory 
(Shamosh et al., 2008), while also using a different memory task (tapping episodic versus 
working memory). Recent integrative work has begun to focus on the relationship 
between memory and value-based decision-making— two research domains that have 
mostly been studied in isolation of each other (Euston, Gruber, & McNaughton, 2012; 
Shadlen & Shohamy, 2016; Weilbächer & Gluth, 2016). Episodic memory, including 
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encoding and retrieval of such memories, is most often associated with the medial 
temporal lobe, and specifically the hippocampus (Eichenbaum, 2004). In contrast, value-
based decision-making is robustly associated, in part, with the vmPFC, where neural 
activity in fMRI experiments tracks the subjective value of choice stimuli (Bartra, 
McGuire, & Kable, 2013; Clithero & Rangel, 2013). A recent review article by Shadlen 
and Shohamy (2016) argues that many value-based decisions entail sequential sampling 
of evidence from memory until a decision threshold is reached, even for decisions where 
the choices need not be retrieved from memory. The authors hypothesize that this 
sequential process is implemented via an interaction between vmPFC and hippocampus, 
where the hippocampus “updates” a decision variable encoded in vmPFC. Furthermore, 
in their view, memory is particularly important to value-based decisions that depend 
either on the integration of distinct past events or on prospection about future events. 
Accordingly, the data presented herein fit into this framework in two ways.  
First, in the adaptive learning study, a plausible explanation for the effect of 
memory ability on normative learning would be that retrieving past outcomes is 
necessary for gradually building a mental model of the environment (akin to model-based 
learning). Related to the above-proposed framework (Shadlen & Shohamy, 2016), 
uncertainty updating in the helicopter task is reliant on activity in both medial temporal 
lobe and vmPFC (McGuire et al., 2014). In healthy aging, both of these regions may 
become less “sensitive” because of age-related dopamine receptor loss (Mohr, Li, & 
Heekeren, 2010; Kaasinen et al., 2000) or brain volume atrophy (Coffey et al., 1992), 
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which may explain differences in uncertainty updating between young and old 
participants in this study.  
Second, in delay discounting, episodic memory could play a role through its 
relation to prospection, i.e., episodic future thinking. Indeed, much research has shown 
that the cognitive processes of remembering past events and imagining possible future 
events are related, and are dependent on a similar network of brain regions, including the 
hippocampus and medial prefrontal cortex (for a review, see Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 
2008). In the context of delay discounting, previous work has shown an explicit link 
between past and future, where individuals discount events into the past to a similar 
degree as they discount events into the future, and both discounting phenomena exhibit 
similar characteristics (Yi, Gatchalian, & Bickel, 2006; Yi, Landes, & Bickel, 2009). 
Moreover, episodic thinking about the future has been identified as one of several 
cognitive processes implicated in delay discounting (Peters and Büchel, 2011). Similarly 
to the proposed mechanism of memory’s role in value-based decision-making (Shadlen & 
Shohamy, 2016), prospection can reduce discounting through a functional interaction 
between hippocampus and medial prefrontal cortex (Peters & Büchel, 2010). Notably, 
although the connection between structure and function in these areas is unclear, cortical 
thickness in both medial prefrontal and, to a lesser extent, medial temporal areas was 
negatively associated with discounting, but we did not specifically test if episodic 
memory is at all related to these structural effects.  
More broadly, combined results from both studies contribute to a growing body of 
work showing that memory is important in value-based decision making. To the extent 
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that lower discounting and more adaptive learning in changing environments are 
desirable, better memory appears to confer additional benefits to individuals.  
Memory versus IQ effects 
In addition to memory effects, results from the adaptive learning study pointed to 
intelligence as another cognitive factor that predicts normative learning (although the 
effect was found in only one of the experiments). In the delay discounting study, higher 
intelligence was associated with lower discounting, as has been previously established 
(Shamosh & Gray, 2008). Intelligence is construed as a general factor that contributes to 
a variety of cognitive tasks, and is highly positively correlated with both episodic and 
working memory, but many have argued that intelligence and memory are distinct 
constructs (Ackerman, Beier, & Boyle, 2005; Conway, Kane, & Engle, 2003; Healey, 
Crutchley, & Kahana, 2014). Given this association and the finding that both constructs 
may contribute to decision-making, the question arises whether these effects are specific 
to one of the constructs or, alternatively, indicative of general effects of superior 
cognitive functioning. In the adaptive learning framework, we were unable to 
conclusively answer this question. Future experiments could address this distinction 
between specific memory versus intelligence effects or general cognitive effects in at 
least two ways.  
A possible experiment with lesion patients can provide causal evidence. Performance of 
hippocampal patients with memory impairments can be compared to that of healthy 
controls, and a group with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) lesions. dlPFC is a core 
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part of a network of regions supporting intelligence (Gläscher et al., 2010; Kane & Engle, 
2002). If one of the lesion groups shows a larger impairment relative to the healthy 
controls, that would suggest that the related process has a primary influence on normative 
learning. Future work will also benefit from using samples of individuals who are more 
representative of the average population in terms of cognitive abilities, thus increasing 
variability and limiting ceiling effects. Understanding the specific cognitive processes 
that underlie adaptive learning could contribute to designing interventions targeted at 
improving decision-making in dynamic environments. 
Brain-as-predictor approach 
An important extension of the work described in Chapter 3 would be to use brain 
data to predict real-life outcomes; specifically, using cortical thickness networks related 
to delay discounting to predict risk-taking behavior in adolescents. As mentioned 
previously, high impulsivity, operationalized as steep discounting, has been linked to a 
host of maladaptive behaviors and outcomes, in both adolescents and adults. It is thus 
plausible that structure of brain regions implicated in delay discounting may be 
associated with these behaviors. This approach of utilizing fundamental neuroscience 
findings that identify neural bases of psychological processes for the prediction of real-
life outcomes that are related to these processes has been termed the “brain-as-predictor” 
approach (Berkman & Falk, 2013). More broadly, improved prediction of human 
economic behavior from neural data has been one of the goals of the field of 
neuroeconomics (Kable & Levy, 2015).  
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Using neural data directly to predict real-life outcomes can be beneficial to the 
extent that it (1) explains variability that has not been accounted for by behavioral or self-
report measures, especially for measures that are subject to considerable measurement 
noise; and (2) elucidates specific sub-processes or mechanisms that are associated with 
the real-life outcome (Berkman & Falk, 2013). For example, we found that cortical 
thickness in several brain regions associated with distinct cognitive processes is 
associated with delay discounting, but it is unclear if these processes contribute to risk-
taking behavior equally. If successful, a future study showing that brain structure in these 
networks of regions directly predicts risk-taking in adolescence offers the promise of a 
fundamental neuroscience contribution to the field of public health. Prediction can 
potentially be further improved by adding other brain measures that carry a signal related 
to delay discounting, and potentially combining structural and functional data, as has 
previously been done in predicting intelligence (Choi et al., 2008). 
Decision-making across the lifespan 
Age is an important factor in the research presented in this dissertation. Stages of 
life such as adolescence and old age are accompanied by significant changes in brain 
structure (Buckner, 2004; Coffey et al., 1992; Giedd et al., 1999; Lenroot et al., 2007; 
Raz et al., 2005) and cognitive abilities (Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006; MacPherson, 
Phillips, & Della Sala, 2002; McArdle, Ferrer-Caja, Hamagami, & Woodcock, 2002), 
which could play a role in individual differences in decision-making. Results from the 
adaptive learning study (Chapter 2) showed that older adults used learning strategies that 
were less influenced by a normative learning factor related to uncertainty, compared to 
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younger adults. This finding contributes to a large literature showing age-related 
differences in both laboratory (Mata, Josef, Samanez‐Larkin, & Hertwig, 2011; 
Samanez‐Larkin & Knutson, 2015; Tymula, Belmaker, Ruderman, Glimcher, & Levy, 
2013) and real-life decision-making (Finucane, Slovic, Hibbard, Peters, Mertz, & 
MacGregor, 2002; Thornton & Dumke, 2005). More specifically, since increased 
learning from uncertainty in the helicopter task is in part associated with higher BOLD 
activity in lPFC (McGuire et al., 2014), our findings are consistent with a report that 
older adults are impaired on tasks dependent on dlPFC function (MacPherson et al., 
2002). The delay discounting study (Chapter 3) was specifically focused on adolescents 
because of the important neurostructural changes during this developmental period and 
the increased risk of impulsive behaviors and outcomes that are associated with higher 
discounting. In a large adolescent sample, cortical thickness associations with delay 
discounting showed some similarities with findings in adults, including neurostructural 
and neurofunctional findings in vmPFC, OFC, and ACC (Bernhardt et al., 2014; Bjork, 
Momenan, & Hommer, 2009; Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Sellitto, Ciaramelli, & di 
Pellegrino, 2010), among other regions. Yet, future studies will be required to directly 
test if the same cortical thickness networks are associated with delay discounting in 
adults.  
Conclusion 
 Decision-making is ubiquitous in life and humans show large variability in 
choices they make and what decision-making strategies they use. The research presented 
here focused on two domains of decision-making and investigated factors that explain 
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differences between individuals. Across two studies, evidence showed that cognitive 
function, age, and brain structure are important factors to consider when studying 
decision-making. Understanding the factors that drive differences in decision-making is 
important, so as to design training for more advantageous decision-making.   
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